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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-3(a) and 
78-2-2(5). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does the proper standard of review for an extraordinary writ brought under Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 65B(d)(2)(A) require that a judicial decision must be a gross and flagrant 
abuse of discretion in order for the court to overturn the decision? The correct standard of 
review is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Lysenko v. Sawaya. 2000 UT 58 Tf 15, 
7P.3d783(Utah2000). 
2. Did the Deputies fail to timely file their grievance with the Utah County Career 
Service Council within three months from the date of the occurrence as required by Utah 
County Office of Personnel Management Rule and Regulation section VILE. 1.? (R 78,1412-
1417, 1422-1430) 
Statute of limitations questions are reviewed for correctness incorporating a clearly 
erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual determination of when the 
Respondents knew or should have known of their alleged legal injuries. Spears v. Reynolds. 
2002 UT 24, Tf 32. 
3. Should this case have been remanded by the Court of Appeals to the District Court for 
further proceedings on the merits? Whether a case should be remanded is a question of law 




Section VII.E.l of the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and 
Regulations (PRR): 
Any career service employee who has completed a Schedule B probationary period 
or a promotional trial period having a grievance over merit principles may appeal to 
the Career Service Council The employee must file a written notice with the 
personnel director within three months from the date of the occurrence . . . 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(d)(2)(A), 65B(d)(4): 
Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative agency 
or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its 
discretion... The Court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether 
the respondent has regularly pursued its authority." 
Utah Code Annotated 17-33-5(3): 
(a)(i). The director shall recommend personnel rules for the county.... 
(b) The rules shall provide for: . . . 
(ii) the establishment of job related minimum requirements wherever practical, that 
all successful candidates shall be required to meet in order to be eligible for 
consideration for appointment or promotion;... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Court granted Petitioner Certiorari in this matter to review a decision of the Court 
of Appeals which ruled that the Fourth District Court erred when it reversed the Utah County 
Career Service Council and determined that Respondents failed to timely file personnel 
grievances. 
In 1991, Utah County Sheriffs Deputies Charles Martin and George Alexanderson 
held the position of shift supervisor in the Utah County Jail. (R 1477 12) Mr. Martin had 
worked with the Sheriffs Office since January of 1986 and was promoted to shift supervisor 
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in June of 1987. (R1477 3,12) Mr. Alexanderson started with the Sheriffs Department on 
February 8, 1988 and was promoted to shift supervisor in April of 1990. (R 1477 57) In 
1991, Deputies Mark Binks, Bonnie Herkimer, Rod Robinson and John Gruenbaum were 
also shift supervisors in the jail. (R 1476 57, 58) John Carlson was the lieutenant over the 
jail, supervising three jail sergeants, Lana Morris (Johnson) and Dixie Jones (Branson), 
(who supervised the shift supervisors) and the administrative sergeant, Mike Pientka. (R 
1476 52-54, Exhibit L, R 850-852) 
In 1991, the Utah County Office of Personnel Management (OPM) maintained job 
descriptions for shift supervisor and jail sergeant.(Ex 1A, IB, R917,915) The Jail Policies 
and Procedures Manual promulgated by the Sheriffs Department(JPPM) contained a duties 
explanation for shift supervisor and jail sergeant/on line which corresponded with 1991 
organizational charts. (Exhibits 1 A, IB, G, L, R833, 850-852) The JPPM regulates day to 
day kinds of activities in the jail. Jail Policies and Procedures were operational and applied 
to the jail only. (R 1477 129, 130). JPPM § 150 provided that promotion of jail staff 
members would be based on the demonstration of merit, specified qualifications and 
competitive examinations, and would be carried out rationally impartially and according to 
the law. Section 150.02 provided that all staff members desiring promotion in the jail would 
be subject to a written examination, oral interview, review of evaluations and length of 
service. Section 150.02.3 required three years of correctional experience including one year 
as a shift supervisor for promotion to jail sergeant. In contrast, the 1991 OPM job 
description minimum qualifications for jail sergeant were four years of experience as a 
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deputy sheriff or detective, POST certification, qualifying score on the sergeant's 
examination. (Exhibit IB, R 914) 
In 1991, Utah County undertook a salary survey which was completed in July of that 
year. The salary survey revised job descriptions after input from employees and consisted 
of all of the job descriptions that were developed. (R1476 42,51) The salary survey did not 
provide a job description for shift supervisor, which was eliminated. (Exhibit 4, R 910, 
Exhibit 5, R 909) Pre-salary survey, employment in the jail was on a career track basis. Post-
salary survey employment in the jail was not. Because shift supervisors were intermediate 
positions, not department-wide sanctioned and confined to specific areas with specific needs, 
the position did not lend itself well to career opportunities and the Sheriff determined it 
would be better if first line supervisors were all of the rank of sergeant. (R 1477 109-111) 
The Sheriff, as a result, eliminated the position of shift supervisor, reclassifying shift 
supervisors to corrections specialists. Promotions to sergeant were then made subsequent 
to the reclassification under a competitive process. (R 1477 112) The Sergeant/Jail 
Operations post salary surveyjob description dated 12-23-91 was retroactive to July 22,1991 
and required as minimum qualifications "Current POST Certification. Current CPR 
Certification, Requires BS degree and three years job related work experience." (R 911 -912, 
Exhibit 1C) 
As a result of the reorganization in the Sheriffs Department after the salary survey, 
the separate career path that had been pursued in the jail was eliminated. Thereafter 
sergeants could be assigned anywhere within the Department at Sheriff Bateman's discretion. 
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(R 1477 124-126) In the 1991 sergeants' selection process, Mr. Alexanderson was 
considered for training, patrol, operations, civil and corrections sergeant's positions. Mr. 
Martin was considered for training and corrections sergeant's positions. (Exhibit O, R 856-
860,1477 113) The selection process for sergeants' promotions in 1991 consisted of resume 
review and promotability assessments completed by all deputy sheriffs who were of the rank 
of sergeant or above for each of the candidates who were qualified. (R 1477 114, 115) 
After the shift supervisor position was eliminated, shift supervisor experience was no longer 
required for promotion to sergeant in the jail. (R 1477 140) 
In December, 1991, shift supervisors Bonnie Herkimer and Mark Binks, and Patrol 
Deputy Dennis Howard, were promoted to Sergeant in the Jail Sgt. Pientka continued as a 
jail sergeant. Shortly after the December 1991 promotions, Mr. Alexanderson transferred to 
Patrol and Mr. Martin transferred to Animal Control. (R 18, 20, 21, 35, 74) 
Mr. Martin did not believe Bonnie Herkimer was peace officer certified, and was not 
sure whether Mark Binks was peace officer certified when promoted in 1991. He did not 
believe Dennis Howard was a shift supervisor for a year and did not have a college degree. 
(R1477 30). On paper shift supervisors were reclassified back to corrections specialists or 
deputy sheriff III and then promoted after being reclassified. (R 1477 31). Mr. Martin 
learned that Herkimer and Binks had been promoted to sergeant when he saw them wearing 
sergeant stripes in December of 1991. (R 1477 32). Mr. Martin applied for sergeant 
positions four times since 1992, the most recent being 1996. (R 1477 36). In the last two 
years before 1997 Mr. Alexanderson did not participate in sergeant's promotions as the 
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sergeant's promotions were in all likelihood were going to remain in the jail the rest of their 
career. (R1477,77-78). Mr. Alexanderson alleged Mark Johnson was promoted to sergeant 
in the Civil Division, in 1990 or 1991, when he saw his sergeant stripes. Rex Murdock in 
Animal Control was promoted without any register or open test, Larry Patterson was 
promoted in October of 1991 to sergeant in Emergency Management, Tom Wroe the County 
Fire Marshall, and Kirby Packham were promoted to sergeant. Yvette Rice was promoted 
to sergeant in 1994 without open competitive testing. (R 1477 85-91) Mike Swenson was 
paid at a Grade 20 the same as sergeants for supervising inmates on work projects. 
The Deputies were on the register for the December 1992 jail sergeant position. 
(Exhibit 16 R 874). Mr. Alexanderson tested for a sergeant's position in 1993, Mr. Martin 
didnotapply. (R1477 141, Exhibit 6). In December 1994 most eligible deputies requested 
the Sheriff promote without testing. Mr. Alexanderson did not apply for this test because he 
did not agree with it, Mr. Martin did and signed the waiver. (Exhibit I, R 836-837, R 1477 
150-151). Both Deputies participated in the 1995 sergeant promotional process. (Exhibit 17, 
R1477 151-152). Mr. Martin participated in 1996 but Mr. Alexanderson did not. (R900). 
The Deputies withdrew from the 1997 promotions after filing grievances with the Utah 
County Career Service Council. (R 1477 54,889) 
On December 17, 1996 the Deputies met with Sheriff Batemai] and raised the 
following issues with Sheriff Bateman in printed outline form. Shift supervisors were 
promised sergeants positions and should have been placed in sergeants' positions before 
subordinates had the opportunity to test; corporal5s(shift supervisors) were promised upgrade 
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to sergeant and were already doing sergeant work; Shift supervisors were asked to vote on 
accepting the rank of sergeant without a related pay raise in a shift supervisor meeting; Mark 
Binks, Bonnie Herkimer, Mark Johnson, and Art Adcock were grandfathered into sergeant's 
rank which should have been the case until all corporal's in good standing were upgraded; 
Written Jail Policy 150.02.3.b mandated one year shift supervisor experience as a 
requirement for eligibility for promotion to sergeant; Corporal's were asked to stop wearing 
rank insignia thereby negating promotions without cause; Subordinate's of those corporals 
were then promoted to ranking positions over the corporal's; the corporals were demoted 
without cause; apparent discrimination towards corporals doing identical job descriptions 
passed over with bias possibly based on likes/dislikes, favoritism, religious intolerance, 
administrative egocentrism, and undisclosed subjective criteria, or whimsical scrutiny. They 
questioned whether other qualified personnel were considered when Yvette Rice was 
i 
appointed. They also alleged "inconsistencies" such as fluctuating eligibility requirements, 
promoting Yvette Rice and Pat Wroe with the uni-division experience and not inter division 
experience; supervisors telling candidates promotional lists would be active for one year 
from testing not the end of one half year due to fiscal calendar year change; varying 
promotional lists with varying candidate placement; perpetration of extreme ethical violations 
during testing. (R 791-792) 
Sheriff Bateman by letter dated December 30, 1996 responded to the December 17, 
1996 meeting with the Deputies. Sheriff Bateman said he found evidence of dissatisfaction 
with departmental promotional policy that is consistent with the issues raised under 
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inconsistencies. (R 340-341) 
The Deputies in January of 1997 filed a grievance with the Utah County Career 
Service Council(CSC). Pursuant to CSC rules the parties submitted Pre-hearing Outlines for 
a pre- hearing to establish ground rules, define issues, identify witnesses and ascertain 
stipulations of fact. Utah County's Pre-hearing Outline alleged that the Deputies grievance 
was not timely filed. (R 78, 1422-1430) At the pre-hearing the CSC, without the benefit of 
a formal motion from the County and/or briefing by the parties, requested the parties to 
briefly address whether the filing of the grievance was done in a timely manner and whether 
it should be heard. This question was addressed by the parties before the CSC along with the 
merits of the case. (R 734-758) By letter dated April 7,1997 the CSC confirmed the CSCs 
decision to proceed in hearing the Deputies grievance on April 23, 1997. (R 821) Utah 
County filed a formal Motion to Dismiss based on the Deputies failure to timely file an 
appeal to the CSC on April 17,1997. (R 1412-1417) The Deputies did not file a response. 
At the April 23, 1997 hearing, the parties addressed the County's motion. After argument 
the CSC stated: 
The Council rules that it is timely filed. We want to be formally on the record 
and we wanted the reasoning to be on the record also. The trigger date for the 
filing was December 17,1996. It was filed—it was a 90 day period to file and 
it was filed January 10th with Marilyn (inaudible) personnel director so that 
matter is no longer at issue. (R 1476 33) 
The CSC heard evidence and arguments in this matter on April 23,1997 and May 29, 
1997. (R 1476, 1477) The Council took this matter under advisement and by letter dated 
June 30,1997 ruled that the Deputies should not be reinstated to the rank of sergeant because 
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they never achieved that rank. The CSC, however, recommended that both be promoted to 
the sergeants rank effective immediately, pay at the sergeants level retroactive to December 
9, 1991 when the first promotions to sergeants became effective after the shift supervisor 
position was eliminated and that the discussion with Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 was 
the date that should drive the time for filing. (R 1142,1143) Utah County filed a Petition 
for Extraordinary Relief in District Court on July 15,1997. Thereafter, the Deputies filed 
a Motion to Dismiss, alleging the CSC decision was not a final appealable order. (R 72) By 
Order dated October 27, 1997 the Court denied the Deputies Motion to Dismiss, but 
remanded the case to the CSC for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R 118-120) 
The Remand Order included direction to the CSC. In Part C of the Order it stated: 
That in connection with the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, the Council may among other things as it in its discretion may elect: 
... v. Make such changes, additions or modifications to his decision as it may 
deem necessary or desirable; and 
vi. Do such other things and take such further actions as it may deem 
necessary or desirable to clarify or enhance the record of the 
proceedings for eventual review by this Court. (R798, 799) 
Pursuant to CSC request, the parties filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law on May 8,1998. On May 26,1998 the parties filed objections to the others' proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R 1205-1377) Mr. Ryan Beuhring's (the final 
CSC member who heard the evidence) CSC term expired at the end of June 1998. Mr. 
Beuhring continued to serve on the CSC until his replacement was appointed in the fall of 
1998, but the CSC had still not issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R 221,222) 
By memorandum dated November 6, 1998, the CSC informed the parties to submit 
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briefs by November 20, 1998 in order to issue findings before the end of the year. (R 814) 
At the Deputies' request, the deadline in which to file the additional briefs was extended 
several times to the 22nd day of March, 1999 while the Deputies sought replacement counsel. 
(R 784-788) Instead of filing an additional brief in March, the Deputies filed an Objection 
to Filing Further Arguments. (R1209) Utah County's Memorandum addressing the merits 
of the case was filed March 22, 1999. (R 1204) By ruling dated November 22, 1999 the 
CSC ruled that this case should be heard de novo in the district court. (R1141) Utah County 
in response thereto filed a Motion to Reconsider before the CSC which the Deputies 
opposed. (R 1159, 1154) Without ruling on the Motion to Reconsider, and pending the 
hearing of a district court Order to Show Cause in April of 2000 regarding compliance with 
the district court's remand order, the CSC issued a ruling dismissing the Deputies' grievance 
as untimely. (R 1137, 1128) In the district court, the Deputies objected to the CSC ruling 
which dismissed their claim. The parties briefed and argued the Deputies' objection which 
was sustained on September 12, 2000. The parties briefed Utah County's Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief. (R 243) Before the District Court, the Deputies for the first time 
argued the discovery rule to support the untimely filing of the Deputies' grievance. (R 362) 
After briefing and argument, by Memorandum Decision dated September 27, 2001, the 
district court accorded the Career Service Council broad deference in its findings of fact, but 
reviewed the Council's conclusions of law for correctness. (R 1460) The district court 
determined that the Deputies' claims were barred as a matter of law by the statute of 
limitations. (R 1454) The court entered an order granting the Petition for Extraordinary 
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Relief, reversing the CSC, and dismissing the Deputies5 claim for failure to timely file their 
grievances. (R 1462) Respondents appealed this matter and the Court of Appeals reversed 
the District Court holding that the Deputies' grievances were timely filed. Utah County v. 
George Alexanderson and Charles Martin 2003 UT App 153. This Court granted Petitioner's 
request for a writ of certiorari. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The decision of the CSC is reversible for an abuse of discretion under URCP 
65B(d)(2)(A). The gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard advanced by the Deputies 
is a standard applicable to extraordinary writs only when the writ would have the effect of 
circumventing a statutorily prohibited appeal. To apply the gross and flagrant standard to all 
extraordinary writs renders the trial court essentially unreviewable and allows trial and 
appellate courts to ignore the law. This deprives litigants of notice of the law to be applied 
and an opportunity for a fair hearing based on the law in violation of Utah and federal due 
process clauses and the Utah open courts provision. 
Other significant reasons to apply an abuse of discretion standard in this case are that 
there is little guidance defining a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion, the gross and 
flagrant standard prohibits review of whether the law was correctly applied as required by 
the URCP 65(B)(d)(4) inquiry into whether the trial court regularly pursued its authority, the 
CSC is not a body entitled to deference, municipal employment decisions are also reviewed 
by an abuse of discretion standard, reviewing for a mistake of law will foster confidence in 
the judicial system, and review of a volunteer, lay body such as the CSC should be more 
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rather than less stringent. 
Utah County Personnel Rules and Regulations required the Deputies to file a 
grievance with the CSC within three months of the occurrence of their grievance in 1991. 
The Deputies failed to do so, and rely on the discovery rule to excuse their failure to timely 
file. The relevant inquiry to determine this question is what the jail sergeant minimum 
qualifications were in 1991 and when did the deputies discover they were not promoted and 
someone else was. To invoke the discovery rule it is necessary for the Deputies to show that 
they did not know and could not have reasonably known of their cause of aiction within the 
limitation period. From the Deputies5 and their counsel's argument and testimony before the 
CSC, it is clear that the Deputies knew or should have known of their cause of action when 
they were not promoted to sergeant in December, 1991, that someone else was promoted, and 
that the Deputies believed they were the only ones qualified for promotion. The Deputies 
were on actual if not inquiry notice of all the key facts in 1991 when they found out they were 
not promoted. The Deputies had access to all Personnel job descriptions and rules and 
regulations and all Sheriff Department manuals in addition to participating in the promotion 
processes. For the next five years the Deputies failed to pursue their claim with reasonable 
diligence. The Deputies cannot place any alleged promise of Sheriff Bateman that "it would 
be made right" within any limitation period upon which they could reasonably rely in not 
pursuing a grievance within the limitation period. The Deputies do not allege any facts 
relevant to a prima facie showing of misleading conduct or fraudulent concealment of key 
facts-the minimum qualifications for jail sergeant, who was promoted, and whether the 
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promoted sergeants met minimum job qualifications. In fact shift supervisor experience and 
peace officer certification were not minimum requirements for promotion to jail sergeant in 
1991 and the deputies promoted to jail sergeant without these qualifications met all jail 
sergeant minimum qualifications. 
The discovery rule, exceptional circumstances prong is also not applicable as this case 
does not concern the performance of a technical service by Utah County and the prejudice 
to Utah County resulting from the passage of time from unavailable witnesses, faded 
memories, and loss of evidence is greater than the hardships imposed by the application of 
the three month limitation of actions. 
Utah County is not estopped from claiming the limitation of actions as no promises 
of making it right, or any promises of promoting the Deputies were made, if at all, during or 
after a limitation period expired. Reliance on any such promise would be unreasonable in 
any event as promoting the Deputies outside of a promotional process would violate merit 
principles which require considering all qualified applicants for a promotion. 
Finally if the Court determines the deputies timely filed their grievance, this case 
should be remanded to determine this case on the merits. The only issue before the Court of 
Appeals was the limitation of actions. Any other statements regarding merit principles in the 
district court memorandum decision were dicta, unnecessary to the decision of the case and 
concerned promotional testing procedural issues not determinative of this case. The fact that 
this Court considers the case as coming directly from the CSC and affords the other appellate 
courts no deference does not change the rules concerning what is appealed from a final order. 
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If the court determines the entire case was before the court of appeals this ruling should be 
given prospective effect only and this matter remanded nonetheless. 
Failure to remand would also deprive Petitioner of its day in court contrary to Utah 
and federal due process clauses and the Utah open courts provisions. The failure of any court 
to determine the 1991 minimum qualifications for jail sergeant prevents Petitioner from 
having its claims and defenses properly adjudicated on the merits according to the facts and 
law. If the Deputies grievance is timely, the Court should remand this case for a 
determination of jail sergeant minimum qualifications or in the alternative determine this 
issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I THE DECISION OF THE CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL IS REVERSIBLE 
FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION1 
County's Petition for Extraordinary Relief is brought under Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure(URCP) 65B(d). It states in relevant part, 
Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative agency 
or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its 
discretion... The Court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether 
the respondent has regularly pursued its authority." URCP 65B(d)(2)(A), 65B(d)(4). 
The relevant inquiry is whether the CSC exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. 
Historically, review of a Rule 65B(d) abuse of discretion included review for a 
1
 The arbitrary and capricious standard advanced by the Deputies below does not 
apply to this case. The arbitrary and capricious standard and direct appeal provisions of 
UCA 17-33-4(l)(d) were enacted April 30, 2001 after this case was appealed to the 
District Court and were not argued by the Deputies to the District Court See 2001 
Amendment Notes to UCA 17-33-4. 
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mistake of law, applying a correction of error standard. Salt Lake Child and Family Clinic 
v, Frederick. 890 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1995); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 
P.2d 23,26,27(Utah App. 199 l)(Involving Salt Lake County Career Service Council stating 
"Since the review performed by the district court under Rule 65B is a review of the entire 
record, it is the same review that would have been afforded if the matter were raised as a 
direct appeal."). Appeal of a CSC decision under URCP 65B(d)(2) was reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney 818 P.2d 23(Utah App. 1991). 
The Tolman court stated that an abuse of discretion 
. . . is a legal term to indicate that the appellate court is of the opinion that there was 
commission of error of law in the circumstances. It is an improvident exercise of 
discretion; an error of law— An abuse of discretion therefore, is an act by a tribunal, 
not a standard of review in and of itself. A reviewing court discovers such acts by 
applying varying standards of review depending on the error alleged.... 
If, however, a party claims that a tribunal has stepped out of the arena of discretion 
and thereby crossed the law, we review using a correction of error standard, giving 
no deference to the tribunal's legal determination. We give no deference to such 
decisions because we are in as good a position as a tribunal to determine the law. 
Obviously the making of a clearly erroneous factual finding is an abuse of discretion 
as is acting unreasonably or misinterpreting the law. In essence a reviewing court 
never overturns a lower tribunal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Id, at 
26, 27. 
Below, the Court Of Appeals ruled that the CSC may be overturned only for a gross 
and flagrant abuse of discretion. This is an unwarranted, ill-advised extension of URCP 
65B(d)2(A) and Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons. 904 P.2d 667 (Utah 1995). In Renn. 
the plaintiff sought an Extraordinary Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking to compel the State 
Board of Pardons to advance his parole hearing date because UCA §77-27-5(3) prohibits an 
appeal from Board of Pardon's actions. This Court ruled in Renn that 
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Because the legislature has directed that there be no right of appeal from Board of 
Pardons actions . . . mandamus and certiorari may not be used as a substitute for a 
statutory appeal. Nevertheless, where there is a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion 
and fundamental principles of fairness are flouted, a court may, giving appropriate 
deference to legislative policy and the extraordinarily difficult duties of the Board of 
Pardons, intervene to correct such abuses by means of an appropriate extraordinary 
writ. Id,, at 683, 684. 
Under Renn, a statutory bar to appeal is a necessary prerequisite to applying the gross and 
flagrant abuse of discretion and fundamental principles of fairness inquiry. Since Renn was 
decided, the Court of Appeals has employed the Renn inquiry in several cases requiring a 
gross and flagrant abuse of discretion prior to overturning any decision, judicial or otherwise, 
under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A). 
In State v. Stirba. 972 P. 2d 918 (Utah App. 1998), the state sought to compel Judge 
Stirba to order over $9,000 in restitution to a crime victim. UCA §77-18-8- L (2)(Supp 1998) 
precluded the state from appealing Judge Stirba5 s restitution order and the court found that 
the state may not use a writ of mandamus to circumvent this restriction. Stirba, at 920. The 
Court however included a statement that exceeded the holding of Renn by stating that an 
"abuse of discretion for Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writs must be much more blatant than the garden 
variety of abuse of discretion featured in routine appellate review", Stirba, at 922. This 
statement opened the door to apply the gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard to all 
65B(d)(2)(A) writs regardless of whether the writ is sought in a circumstance when an appeal 
is prohibited by statute. Stirba noted that although the lower court inconectly interpreted a 
restitution statute, it was a simple mistake of law that did not qualify as the kind of gross and 
flagrant abuse of discretion necessary for a Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue, IdL, at 923, 
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thereby preventing any meaningful review of a lower tribunals application of the law. 
While Stirba held that a simple mistake of law does not qualify as the kind of gross 
and flagrant abuse of discretion necessary for Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue, the Stirba 
court, in reaching this conclusion, relied heavily on the fact that 
. . . this proceeding has the same characteristics and seeks the same review and relief, 
as a statutory appeal from Judge Stirba's restitution order. Hence, to avoid 
transforming this action into an impermissible appeal, we must deny the state's 
request for Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) Writ of Mandamus ... Based on our determination that 
Judge Stirba [did not abuse] her discretion under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A), coupled with 
our holding that the state's action is tantamount to an impermissible appeal, the state's 
Petition for Extraordinary Writ is hereby denied. Id. at 923. 
The Renn gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard should only be applied when an 
appeal is statutorily prohibited. In reviewing this matter the Court should engage in standard 
appellate review. 
In the instant matter, the Court of Appeals has applied the gross and flagrant abuse 
of discretion standard to a case where appeal under Rule 65B was provided by statute. When 
Petitioner filed the Petition for Extraordinary Relief in 1997, the County Personnel 
Management Act directed that"... a right of appeal to the district court under the provisions 
ofthe Utah Rules ofCivil Procedure shall not be abridged." U.C.A. 17-33-4(l)(Supp. 1997). 
The instant action is undertaken pursuant to a statutory right of appeal and the Renn standard 
advanced by the Deputies is not applicable. 
The application of the Renn standard to all writs sought under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) 
violates the principles of Due Process, Fundamental Fairness and access to the courts by 
allowing a court, even though it recognizes the law was misapplied, to disregard the law 
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because a mistake is not gross and flagrant, thus depriving litigants of notice of the law to 
be applied and a fair hearing by allowing trial and reviewing courts to ignore the law. Both 
the due process clause of article I section 7 and the open courts provision of article I section 
11 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that litigants will have their day in court. Miller v. 
USAACas.Ins.Co.. 2002 UT 6 ^ 38,44 P.3d 663,673. No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law. Article I, section 7, Utah Constitution; 
United States Constitution 5th and 14th Amendments. Article I section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution provides 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a party. 
The court's policy is to "resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in 
court on the merits of a controversy." Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, 657 P.2d 1293,1296 (Utah 1997) (quoting Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 
603 (Utah 1976)) Inherent in due process protections are adequate notice and a right to a fair 
hearing. No party to a legal action can have adequate notice and a fair hearing if the tribunal 
or reviewing court can misapply or ignore the law without any possibility of a meaningful 
review or correction. Under the gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard, litigants cam 
never have fair notice of the law to be applied. Litigants should be able to make decisions 
based on the law and expect that a reviewing court would always apply the law to the matter 
reviewed, whether a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion or a "simple'9, "garden variety" 
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error of law. The gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard applied across the board 
deprives litigants of any certainty that they may make and evaluate decisions and actions 
based on the law and that their decisions will be evaluated under the law by reviewing courts. 
To allow otherwise erodes the confidence of litigants in the judicial system and prevents the 
operation of the basic concept that "At a minimum, a day in court means that each party shall 
be afforded the opportunity to present claims and defenses, and have them properly 
adjudicated on the merits according to the facts and the law." Miller, TJ 41. Both the due 
process clause of Article I Section 7 and the open courts provision of Article I Section 11 of 
the Utah Constitution guarantee that litigants will have this open day in court. The analysis 
to determine a denial of a day in court is the same under the due process and open courts 
provisions. Miller, 1f 38. Because the key issue of minimum qualification for jail sergeant 
has not been decided to date by any court, there has been no proper adjudication on the merits 
according to the facts and the law. 
Stirba and Renn also do not provide any guidance or rules to define a gross and 
flagrant abuse of discretion. The gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard is contrary 
to the clear abuse of discretion language of Rule 65B(d) and prevents any meaningful review 
of the CSC's application of the law. 
The Stirba holding also prevents the review required by Rule 65B(d)(4) which 
requires that a review of judicial proceedings "shall not extend further than to determine 
whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority." Such a determination includes 
whether the lower court correctly applied the law. Explaining what it means for the Public 
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Service Commission to regularly pursue its authority, this Court stated in Utah Dept. of 
Admin. Serv. V. Pub. Serv. Com'n 658 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983) 
In reviewing the Commission's interpretations of general questions oflaw, this Court 
applies a correction-of-error standard with no deference to the expertise of the 
Commission. General questions of law include interpretation of the United States 
Constitution and the Acts of Congress, and interpretation of the Utah Constitution and 
the Acts of the Legislature (except those defined below as special laws). This is the 
type of review specified in the first sentence of the statute quoted above, i.e., whether 
the Commission has "regularly pursued its authority" and whether it has violated any 
constitutional or statutory rights of the petitioner. 
This statement is in accordance with this Court's statement following a quotation of Rule 
65B(e)(4), now 65B(d)(4), "Since the issue here involves the interpretation and application 
of a statute, the trial court's legal conclusion is granted no particular deference but is 
reviewed for correctness." Frederick, at 1019. In this instance, the gross and flagrant abuse 
of discretion standard prevents the review required to determine whether the CSC regularly 
pursued its authority and should not be applied. 
Unlike the Renn and Stirba, which involved decisions of restitution and parole dates, 
there is no similar grant of discretion and deference to the CSC. The CSC is not a policy 
making body entitled to deference. Utah County is the body charged with the administration 
of the County Personnel Management Act. See UCA 17-33-5, 17-33-7. In this case the 
traditional abuse of discretion standard is best to allow courts to redress employer and 
employee grievances. 
The Stirba decision also results in a situation where application of the law by 
municipal civil service commissions on municipal employment decisions would be reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion, correction of error standard, Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv, 
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Comm'n 2000 UT App 235,^|15, while counties would be held to the Stirba interpretation 
of an abuse of discretion which prohibits review of CSC decisions for a misapplication of 
the law. There is no reason that the standard employed in reviewing municipal personnel 
decisions should be any different than county personnel decisions. 
Review of Rule 65B matters for a mistake of law will grant litigants the confidence 
that their decisions can be made and will be reviewed according to the law. Otherwise a 
lower tribunal's application of the law is essentially unaccountable under Rule 65B, opening 
the door for uncertainty and eroding confidence in the judicial system. Oversight of an 
appointed, volunteer, lay body such as the CSC should be more, rather than less, stringent 
to adequately protect the rights of the parties. 
n THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review to be applied by the Court in reviewing statue of limitations 
questions was recently stated in Spears v. Reynolds, 2002 UT 24, ^  32. Therein this Court 
stated: 
The applicability of a statute of limitations and the applicability of the 
discovery rule are questions of law which we review for correctness. See, e.g., 
Quick Safe-T Hitch. Inc. v. RSB Svs. L.C. 2000 UT 84, ^10, 12 P.3d 577; 
Clineer v. Rightly. 791 P2d 868, 869-70(Utah 1990). However, the 
applicability of the statute of limitations and the discovery rule also involves 
a subsidiary factual determination—the point at which a person reasonably 
should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury. This is a question of 
fact. See, e.g., Sew v. Sec. Title Co. of S. Utah. 902 P2d 629, 634 (Utah 
1995); Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P2d 916, 919 (Utah 1993) (The point at 
which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal 
injury is a question of fact.) Accordingly, we review for correctness 
incorporating a clearly erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual 
determination of when the Plaintiffs should have known of their alleged legal 
injuries. 
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Ill UTAH COUNTY PERSONNEL JOB DESCRIPTIONS SET THE MINIMUM 
QUALIFICATIONS FOR JAIL SERGEANT AND DID NOT INCLUDE POST 
PEACE OFFICER CERTIFICATION OR SHIFT SUPERVISOR 
EXPERIENCE 
Before considering the limitation of actions issues in this case it is necessary to 
determine the minimum requirements for promotion to jail sergeant that were in effect in 
1991. The minimum qualifications for jail sergeant are the key factual determination in 
deciding when the Deputies knew or should have known of their cause of action under the 
discovery rule. This case turns on a determination of the 1991 jail sergeant minimum 
qualifications. The only finding that could support the CSC award of back pay would be thait 
the Deputies were the only candidates that met the minimum qualifications for jail sergeant 
in 1991. Marshaling the facts regarding this issue is difficult in that no tribunal including the 
CSC to date has determined the 1991 jail sergeant minimum qualifications. Marshaling is 
also clouded by the fact that the CSC made inconsistent rulings on the Deputies requested 
relief. The CSC declined to order retroactive reinstatement to sergeant becaiuse the Deputies 
never made sergeant, but then ordered back pay to December 1991 and immediate promotion. 
Necessary to the back pay order is a finding that the Deputies were the only candidates that 
met minimum requirements for jail sergeant. Marshaling facts as though the CSC had 
determined that the JPPM set minimum requirements for jail sergeant in 1991 and that the 
Deputies were the only qualified candidates follows. 
A. EVIDENCE SUPPORTING A FINDING THAT THE JPPM SET 
MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS FOR JAIL SERGEANT IN 1991 AND 
THE DEPUTIES WERE THE ONLY QUALIFIED CANDIDATES. 
Deputy Martin testified he was category I or peace officer certified when he 
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commenced working with Utah County in January of 1986. (R1477 p 11) Deputy Martin 
was also corrections certified. (R1477 p 11) Deputy Martin was promoted to shift 
supervisor on June 24, 1987. (R1477 p 12) Deputy Martin was a shift supervisor for 
approximately four years. (R1477p 16) Based on'^seemingly assurances" throughout the 
years prior where they had talked about upgrading the shift supervisor position to sergeants, 
i 
Deputy Martin assumed that when the first news came that the shift supervisor position was 
going to be eliminated, that those serving in that capacity would be promoted to sergeants. 
(R1477 p 19-20) At the time of the 1991 promotions, the Deputies felt that they were as 
qualified, if not more qualified, than Mark Binks and Bonnie Herkimer, inasmuch as the 
Deputies were peace officer certified. (R1477 p 21) Deputy Martin understood the 
minimum qualifications for jail sergeant for the 1991 promotions were shift supervisor for 
one year, off probation, peace officer certification, knowledgeable enough or proven 
competent and a college degree was required for hiring at the jail. Deputy Martin understood 
the JPPM § 127.03 to be a description of the minimum qualifications for jail sergeant in 1991 
when Herkimer and Binks were promoted as jail sergeants, which indicates jail sergeant on 
line would have category I police status. (R1477p23,R833) JPPM § 150.02 required three 
years of correctional experience including one year as a shift supervisor for promotion to 
sergeant. (R1477 p 24, R834) Deputy Martin understood this policy to be applicable in 
December, 1991 when Herkimer, Binks, and Howard were promoted. (R1477 p 25) 
Because a college degree is the minimum hiring requirement for a corrections specialist at 
the jail, Deputy Martin assumed that a college degree was required for any position in the 
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jail. (R1477 p 25, 26) Bonnie Herkimer and Mark Binks were not POST [peace officer] 
certified when they were promoted to sergeant. Dennis Howard was POST [peace officer] 
certified because he was in patrol. (R1477 p 30) Deputy Howard was not a shift supervisor 
for a year prior to promotion. Deputy Martin did not know if Deputy Howard had a college 
degree. (R1477 p 30) Deputy Martin had served as a shift supervisor for a year, had a 
college degree, and was category I POST certified, and had three years experience at the 
sheriffs office in 1991. (R1477 p 30-31) In 1997, when testimony was taken on this ceise, 
the jail policy regarding shift supervisor experience had not been rescinded. (R1477 p 37) 
George Alexanderson testified that he was promoted to shift supervisor in April of 
1990. Dennis Howard, who ranked third in the 1991 jail sergeant promotions, did have 
correctional experience, but did not have a college degree and had not been a shift 
supervisor. (R1477 p 64-67, 72) Sergeant Pientka went on his own time to POST to get 
certified as a peace officer while a shift supervisor. He did this to be deemed eligible while 
a shift supervisor for a promotion. (R1477 p 73) Sheriffs Policy and Procedure 340 lists 
shift supervisor as fifth in eight ranks between Sheriff and deputy sheriff I. (R855) 
Numerous individuals failed to qualify for peace officer certification during their six months 
probation and were left in their positions without being returned to their previous position. 
(R1477 p 100) The sheriffs policy and the jail manual were not revised to show that the 
rank of shift supervisor was eliminated. (R1477 p 104) 
The minimum qualifications for a shift supervisor were four years of college, thirty 
units of which must have been in sociology, psychology, or closely related field, and two 
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years of full time employment as a corrections specialist or any equivalent combination of 
education and experience. (R 917, Exhibit 1A) 
JPPM §127.03 for Jail Sergeant On Line states: 
"A. General Classification: Deputy Sheriff 
1. Category One Police Status." (R833 Exhibit G) 
B. CONFLICTING AND CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
A FINDING THAT THE PRR SET THE MINIMUM 
QUALIFICATIONS FOR JAIL SERGEANT IN 1991. 
Deputy Martin was promoted to shift supervisor at the same time as Bonnie Herkimer 
and Mark Binks on June 24, 1987. In September or October of 1991, Deputy Martin was 
told there were no more shift supervisors by Captain Quarnberg and Lieutenant Carlson. 
(R1477 17) Around the end of December, 1991 Capt. Quarnberg and Lt. Carlson came in 
with new job descriptions. Captain Quarnberg said you can stop wearing your two stripes and 
promoted Bonnie Herkimer and Mark Binks. (R1477 18) Deputy Alexanderson made plans, 
saw this coming, when they started talking about just promoting two sergeants and made 
arrangements to transfer to patrol. (R1477 18) Deputy Martin was verbally told for months 
prior that the position of shift supervisor was going to be eliminated. (R1477 18) Exhibit 
IB was the Personnel Office jail sergeant's job description in effect before the salary survey 
and new job descriptions were issued around the time of the 1991 promotions. (R1477 28) 
Minimum qualifications on Exhibit IB, required four years of experience as a deputy sheriff 
or detective, POST certification, qualifying score on sergeants9 examination. (R 914) The 
post salary survey sergeant jail operations9 job description required current POST 
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certification and current CPR certification, BS degree, including 30 hours in psychology, 
sociology, interpersonal relations, or closely related field, and three years job related work 
experience with demonstrated competence. (R 911) It was announced in a shift supervisor 
meeting that there were now no longer any shift supervisors. (R1477 39) The position of 
shift supervisor was eliminated after the salary survey. (R1477 44-45) Deputy Martin was 
allowed to receive his POST corrections certification after he was hired by Utah County. 
(R1477 46-47) Sergeants who were hired in the jail were allowed to qualify for peace officer 
POST certification during their sergeant probationary period. (R1477 47-48) On August 15, 
1991 Sheriff Bateman issued a memorandum to all employees which indicated that all shift 
supervisor positions are to be eliminated, that shift supervisors will be reclassified to deputy 
sheriff III or corrections specialist without an associated loss of pay. (R 909) When it was 
announced that the shift supervisor position was eliminated, Deputy Martin did not 
understand that everyone who was a shift supervisor would automatically be made a sergeant. 
(R1477 51-52) 
Deputy Alexanderson testified he received his corrections certification to work in the 
Utah County Jail after he was hired. (R1477 61) The Sheriffs Office policy is to allow 
promoted individuals to obtain their peace officer certification during probationary periods, 
with the understanding that the person gets the certification while on a probationary period. 
(R1477 99-100) 
Sheriff David Bateman testified that the 1991 salary survey surveyed all positions 
within Utah County and made recommendations regarding salary and job descriptions. The 
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shift supervisor position was eliminated as line supervisor positions were recommended to 
be at the sergeant level, rather than intermediate positions that were not department wide. 
(R1477 110) When the shift supervisor position was eliminated, shift supervisors were 
reclassified and subsequent promotions to sergeant occurred. (R1477 111-112) In every 
case, the hiring roster for sergeants' promotions was approved by the personnel director as 
having met merit principles. (R1477 116) Before the 1991 sergeants'promotions, all of the 
positions and the candidates who applied were reviewed by personnel, which determined 
who was eligible for promotion to sergeant. (R1477 117-118) From 1991 to the time of the 
hearing of this matter, peace officer certification was not required prior to testing for a 
sergeants'position in the jail. (R1477 122-123) Economics prohibited Sheriff Bateman 
from training deputies serving in the jail as both corrections and peace officers. (R1477 124) 
In 1991, with the creation of the new organizational structure resulting from the salary 
survey, the separate career path that had existed in the jail was eliminated and a sergeant 
could be assigned anywhere within the department at the sheriffs discretion. (R1477 124, 
125,137) In 1991, had the separate career path philosophy in the jail continued, only those 
people that were in the jail would have been allowed to test for jail positions. (R1477 125) 
Deputies were able to apply for any sergeant's position as long as they met minimum 
requirements. The individual would be required to, within the probationary period, achieve 
necessary POST certification levels whether it be corrections or peace officer. (R1477 126) 
The JPPM is a manual that was prepared to insure that the jail was in compliance with 
state standards and regulates the day to day activities in the jail. Portions of the County Rules 
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and Regulations were included for clarification, but it is just a guide. The JPPM is 
operational and applies to the jail only. (R1477 129) The JPPM and the Sheriffs Policies 
and Procedures are advisory to be used to help define and to know what's expected in terms 
of interpreting county rules and regulations. (R1477 129-130) County Rules and Regulations 
are adopted by and promulgated through the personnel office by the county commission. The 
County Rules and Regulations impact the Sheriffs department manuals, which are advisory 
and are looked at as being of assistance, being interpretive in nature of the County Rules and 
Regulations. (R1477 130) Personnel office announcements are part of the Rules and 
Regulations and impact what the Sheriffs Office does with respect to Sheriffs Policies and 
Procedures. (R1477 130) The Sheriffs Department manuals have not been updated to the 
extent they ought to be or what Sheriff Bateman would like to have them be because Sheriff 
Bateman did not have the time. (R1477 131) The sergeant's job announcements that came 
out of the personnel office stated that sergeants could be certifiable or receive their peace 
officer certification after promotion. (R1477 131) After the elimination of the shift 
supervisor position, Sheriff Bateman did not consider shift supervisor experience as a 
requirement for promotion to sergeant in the jail. (R1477 139-140) Determinations regarding 
promotion candidate eligibility were made by the personnel office. (R1477 140-141, Exhibit 
6) The controlling document between jail policy, sheriff department policy, and county 
regulations, are the county regulations. (R1477 160) A college degree was not required for 
promotion to sergeant from 1991 on. (R1477 167) 
Deputy Mark Binks, a shift supervisor in 1991, did not believe that all shift 
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supervisors would automatically be made sergeants. He was advised that the shift supervisor 
position would probably be done away with and that shift supervisors were eligible to test 
for sergeant. Deputy Binks did not have an expectation that he would be made a sergeant. 
It was brought up that shift supervisors were in a good position of being promoted. (R1477 
183-184) 
The sergeant's job description from the salary survey, Exhibit 1-C, was retroactive 
back to the implementation of the reclassification study on July 22, 1991. (R1476 49) 
In a shift supervisor meeting on September 6, 1991, Capt. Quarnberg announced, 
There are now no shift supervisors. Everyone will remain where they are for now. 
Between now and October 1st, decisions will be made about how to implement the 
three new categories of probation, training, and competency. The Sheriff is currently 
rewriting the lieutenants' and sergeants' positions throughout the department. If the 
commission will sign the UCP8 personnel action forms in their next meeting, the 
sheriff will have changes and promotions by October 1,1991. (R823 Exhibit A, 1476 
70) 
On September 19,1991 shift supervisors were advised that the salary survey passed 
and the commission should approve the UCP8 form personnel actions and send them out to 
us. (R1476 75) 
October 3, 1991 shift supervisor meeting minutes indicate, 
Personnel has the list ready to go. They screened the applications for appropriate 
qualifications, they took out some that should not have been omitted. They will do 
the list again and send to the division commander, who will evaluate each person and 
then start the interview process." (R830-829, 1476 80) 
i 
Special function, corrections and police officer certifications are all state POST certification 
standards. (R1476 98) If a candidate for sergeant wasn't certified as a peace officer through 
POST, they were required to successfully go through POST after being promoted. (R1476 
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99, 100) 
UCP8fs are personnel action forms that go through the county commission, are signed 
off by the sheriff and county commission, and audited and put in employee files. (R1476 
102) Dixie Brunson, Lana Morris, and Bonnie Herkimer were POST certifiable when 
promoted to jail sergeant (R1476 103) It is common practice throughout the department to 
allow someone during a probationary period to achieve POST certifications. (R1476 123) 
Owen Quarnberg, the jail commander in 1991, never made any commitments or 
promises to all shift supervisors that they would be made sergeants. Deputies Martin and 
Alexanderson never approached him wondering why they were not reclassified to sergeants 
from shift supervisors. (R1476 131-132) 
The JPPM primarily regulated the operation of the jail. (R1476 138) Sheriffs 
Policies and Procedures took precedence over Jail Policies. (R1476 138-139) Utah County 
Policies and Procedures took precedence over Sheriffs Office and Jail Policies and 
Procedures. (R1476 139-140) JPPM § 150.02 applied only to the jail. (R1476 141-142) 
Captain Quarnberg was not satisfied with the shift supervisor position. He felt that 
sergeants selected in a department wide promotional process, who had the experience 
required of people being promoted to sergeant would land real credibility to the deputies 
working in the jail with law enforcement agencies, did not believe shift supervisors had been 
particularly effective and desired to have a sergeant to hold accountable for making sure that 
shifts were being done according to Sheriffs standards. (R1476 155-157) Captain 
Quarnberg did not feel that shift supervisor and sergeants' jail positions were the same and 
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wanted to change the shift supervisor position by eliminating it, and do a sergeant's 
promotional exam to put sergeants on the shift. (R1476 173-174) 
In the August 225 1991 shift supervisor meeting, shift supervisors were directed to 
submit a one page letter or memo to the sheriff indicating that they want to be considered for 
a s^raeanfs position. (R1476 189-190) 
The minimum requirements for a pre salary survey jail sergeant listed in the Office 
of Personnel Management job description were four years experience as a deputy sheriff or 
detective, POST certification, qualifying score on sergeant's examination. (R 914-915 
Exhibit IB) 
The post salary survey Sergeant Jail Operations Office of Personnel Management job 
description required current POST certification, current CPR certification, BS degree 
including thirty hours in psychology, sociology, interpersonal relations or closely related 
field, three years job related work experience with demonstrated competence. (R 911-912 
Exhibit 1C) 
Sheriff Bateman's August 15, 1991 memo to all employees advised that shift 
supervisor positions were to be eliminated and those filling the positions will automatically 
be reclassified to corrections specialist. The memo also requested eligible employees to 
submit a resume for each area where they desired consideration. It further advised that the 
personnel department will determine eligibility on the basis of the resume and certify a 
register from which the positions will be filled. (R 909 Exhibit 5) 
C. PEACE OFFICER CERTIFICATION WAS NOT A MINIMUM 
QUALIFICATION FOR JAIL SERGEANT. 
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The Deputies' claim that POST peace officer certification was a minimum 
requirement for promotion to jail sergeant in 1991 rests on JPPM § 127.03. It stated 
"A. General Classification: Deputy Sheriff 
1. Category One Police Status." (R 833, Exhibit G) 
JPPM § 127.03, however is inconsistent with both the pre and post salary survey sergeants 
job descriptions maintained by the Utah County Office of Personnel Management. The pre 
salary survey job description required only "P.O.S.T. Certification". The post salary survey 
sergeants job description required "current POST certification". Neither indicates peace 
officer certification but only POST certification which maybe special functions, corrections 
or peace officer/category I/law enforcement certifications. The last three terms, peace 
officer/category I/law enforcement, are synonymous and have denoted statewide police 
authority at various times in the past. Holding any one of the POST certifications, 
corrections, special functions or peace officer, qualified a candidate for the POST 
certification requirements contained in the pre and post salary survey Personnel job 
descriptions. 
The inconsistency in the Personnel job descriptions and the JPPM should be resolved 
by the County Personnel Management Act, UCA 17-33-5, which provides in relevant part 
(3) (a) (i) The director shall recommend personnel rules for the county.... 
(b) The rules shall provide for:. . . 
(ii) the establishment of job related minimum requirements wherever practical, that 
all successful candidates shall be required to meet in order to be eligible for 
consideration for appointment or promotion;... 
County personnel rules determine minimum job requirements, not individual county 
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departments. Even if JPPM § 127.03 stated minimum job requirements, it could not change 
the requirements contained in Personnel jail sergeant job descriptions in Exhibits 1-B and 1-
C which required only POST certification. The Deputies have further failed to show that 
Petitioner's personnel rules provided for the Sheriff to establish minimum requirements for 
jail sergeant. 
Also consistent with the fact that peace officer certification was not required for 
consideration for jail sergeant is the Department's practice of allowing promoted sergeants 
to obtain peace officer certification after promotion to sergeant. JPPM § 127.03 entitled 
"JAIL SERGEANT (ON-LINE)" does not correspond with either the pre or post salary 
survey personnel job descriptions which are for "Jail Sergeant" and "Sergeant/Jail 
Operations". Nor was the designation of category I police status designated as a minimum 
requirement in the JPPM. JPPM § 127.03 also omits education, experience and other 
requirements found on the Personnel Office job descriptions. Does silence in the JPPM as 
to other job requirements found in the Personnel job descriptions eliminate the other 
requirements? In light of the County Personnel Management Act and the reasons stated 
above, the Court should determine that any implied finding that peace officer certification 
was required for promotion to jail sergeant in 1991 was clearly erroneous. 
D. SHIFT SUPERVISOR EXPERIENCE WAS NOT REQUIRED FOR 
PROMOTION TO JAIL SERGEANT IN 1991. 
Based on the same reasoning that personnel job descriptions govern if the terms of the 
JPPM are in conflict with Personnel job descriptions, the jail sergeant minimum qualification 
found in JPPM §150.023.b, of one year as a shift supervisor experience is not applicable. 
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Both Personnel sergeant job descriptions conflict with the JPPM shift supervisor 
requirement. The Personnel pre salary survey requirement was 4 years experience as a 
deputy sheriff The Personnel post salary survey and current job description is 3 years related 
work experience. Neither job description requires any shift supervisor experience. 
With the issuing of a new sergeant job description in 1991 which does not require shift 
supervisor experience and the elimination of the shift supervisor position, the JPPM shift 
supervisor requirement if ever binding was eliminated along with the position. The conflict 
in the JPPM and Personnel job descriptions should be resolved by giving the personnel job 
descriptions precedence. To put the foot on the other shoe, someone meeting all the 
requirements of the Personnel job descriptions who was not a shift supervisor or peace 
officer who wanted to test for jail sergeant would have been allowed to test as the Personnel 
job descriptions took precedence. 
Because the Personnel job descriptions take precedence over the JPPM, the shift 
supervisor position was eliminated, and a new sergeant job description issued without a shift 
supervisor requirement, any finding that shift supervisor experience was required for 
promotion to jail sergeant in 1991 is clearly erroneous. 
IV. THE DEPUTIES FAILED TO FILE THEIR GRIEVANCE WITHIN THREE 
MONTHS AS REQUIRED BY UTAH COUNTY PERSONNEL RULES AND 
REGULATIONS AND IT IS THEREFORE BARRED 
Section VILE.l of the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and 
Regulations (OPMRR) states in relevant part: 
Any career service employee who has completed a . . . probationary period . . . 
having a grievance over merit principles may appeal to the Career Service Council. 
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The employee must file a written notice with the personnel director within three 
months from the date of the occurrence . . . 
Filing the appeal with the personnel director within three months is a jurisdictional 
requirement. In Brendle v. City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044 (Ut. Ct. App 1997) the court held 
that a 14 day time limit to appeal a planning commission decision was jurisdictional, stating 
that the City Council was without jurisdiction to consider a landowners appeal filed after the 
14 day time limit expired. Similarly, an employee having a grievance over merit principles 
must file a written appeal to the CSC within three months from the date of the occurrence of 
the grievance. Failure to do so is jurisdictional. 
The three month time limitation within which an employee must file their appeal to 
the CSC commences when the grievance occurs. 
Generally, a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of limitations begins to 
run when the last event that will complete the cause of action occurs, and simple 
ignorance of or obliviousness to the existence of a cause of action will not prevent the 
running of the statute of limitations. 
Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc. 920 P.2d 575,578 (Utah App. 1996). In Doit Inc. 
v. Touche. Ross and Company, 926 P.2d 835, 843 (Utah 1996) the Utah Supreme Court 
stated applicable rules on when a cause of action accrues as follows: 
Under Utah law5 a statute of limitations begins to run against a party when the cause 
of action accrues. . . . As a general rule, a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff 
could have first filed and prosecuted an action to successful completion.... Once a 
claim accrues, it may not be maintained unless it is commenced within the limitations 
prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations. [Citations omitted] 
In the instant matter, the Deputies grievance occurred when the promotion decisions 
for jail sergeant were made in December of 1991 and subsequent years. After the promotions 
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occurred, the Deputies had three months within which to file a grievance with the CSC. The 
Deputies failed to appeal promotion decisions within three months of the promotions, and 
they cannot be permitted to pursue such claims more than five years after the 1991 
promotions and outside of 3 months of any other promotions. 
No promotion decision was made in the three months prior to January 10,1997, when 
the Deputies filed their request for CSC review, and the Deputies' claims are therefore baited 
by the 3 month limitation of actions. 
V IT WOULD BE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS TO DETERMINE THAT THE 
DEPUTIES DID NOT KNOW OF AND COULD NOT REASONABLY HAVE 
KNOWN OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION WITHIN THE 
LIMITATION PERIOD 
Generally a cause of action accrues and the relevant statue of limitations begins to rim 
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 upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action... [and] 
mere ignorance of the existence of the cause of action does not prevent the running 
of the statute of limitations'. However in certain instances the discovery rule allows 
for the tolling of the statute of limitations'until the discovery of facts forming the 
basis for the cause of action'. 
This court has recognized three circumstances where the discovery rule 
applies: (1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in 
situations where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of 
the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where the 
case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would 
be irrational or unjust regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented the 
discovery of the cause of action. 
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838P.2d 1125, 1128, 1129 (Utah 1992). 
"If the discovery rule applies, the applicable statute of limitations is held to have 
commenced running only at the time the plaintiff first knew or should have known the facts 
giving rise to the cause of action". Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 
578 (Utah App. 1996). In order to consider the discovery rule, "an initial showing must be 
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made that the plaintiff did not know of and could not reasonably have known of the existence 
of the cause of action in time to file a claim within the limitation period." Warren v. Provo 
Citv Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992); Sevev v. Security Title Company. 902 P.2d 
629,634 (Utah 1995); O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139,1144 (Utah 
1991) 
The limitation period is postponed only by the belated discovery of key facts and not 
by delayed discovery of legal theories. To determine whether a plaintiff should have 
discovered the facts forming the basis of a cause of action two concepts must be 
considered, inquiry notice and reasonable diligence. Was the plaintiff on notice that 
she might have a cause of action and if so was she reasonably diligent in investigating 
the facts surrounding the loss. 
As to inquiry notice,c the test is whether the plaintiff has information of circumstances 
sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry... 
Where the circumstances are such as to suggest to a person of ordinary intelligence 
the probability that he has been defrauded, the duty of inquiry arises, and if he omits 
that inquiry when it would have developed the truth, and shuts his eyes to the facts 
which call for investigation, knowledge of the fraud will be imputed to him'. 
Anderson, at 579. 
To invoke the discovery rule, therefore, it is necessary for the Deputies to show that 
within the limitation period they did not know and could not reasonably have known that they 
were not promoted in 1991, and that the promoted deputies did not meet minimum job 
qualifications. 
Below, the Deputies advanced the following in support of a finding that they did not 
know or should not have known of the cause of action before December, 1996. The 
discovery in December of 1996 of illegal testing activities; Sheriff Bateman's December 30th 
1996 pronouncement that shift supervisor was never a ranked position; that the Sheriff had 
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acted on a false premise in every promotional testing process utilized by the Department 
since the elimination of the shift supervisor rank; that shift supervisor was never a ranked 
position; the Sheriff acknowledged for the first time in December 1996 that there had been 
inconsistencies in the Department's promotional process; the Deputies were repeatedly 
assured by Department management that they would be treated fairly as a result of the 
reclassification of their positions and the Sheriff assured them that he would make things 
right; the Deputies were urged by the Department to resolve their issues internally, feeling 
considerable institutional pressure for them to do so; unbeknownst to the Deputies until 
December 1996, the promotion and eligibility requirements fluctuated widely and were often 
disregarded by Department management. (Court of Appeals Brief of Appellant, page 26,27) 
These considerations are simply not relevant to when the Deputies discovered the key 
facts-that the Deputies were not promoted in December 1991 and that deputies not meeting 
minimum requirements were promoted to jail sergeant in December 1991. 
Anything concerning the fairness of the testing process, procedural irregularities 
or whether testing policies were followed is not relevant. A finding that the testing process 
did not comply with policy would not result in the Deputies promotion to sergeant. Any such 
finding would result in setting aside the promotion and conducting a new process meeting 
required policies. This the Deputies did not request. They requested promotion. The alleged 
testing irregularities are irrelevant as to whether the Deputies were the only qualified deputies 
to be promoted to jail sergeant in 1991. 
The discovery through Mr. Martin's conversation with Sergeant Morgan of alleged 
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testing improprieties concerned a non ranked patrol position and is unrelated to the Deputies 
or the 1991 promotions. The date of Mr. Martin's conversation with Sgt. Morgan is not in 
the CSC record and should not be considered. The Deputies alleged the date of this 
conversation for the first time when this matter was briefed in the District Court. Sheriff 
Bateman's December 30, 1996 "admission" to the Deputies claimed "inconsistencies" in 
promotion policy is also not relevant to whether the Deputies should have been promoted in 
December 1991. SheriffBateman's December 30,1996 response was not in the record when 
the CSC decided this matter and should not be considered. Sheriff Bateman's December 30, 
1996 response was added to the record in June of 1998 over Utah County's due process 
objection after this matter was remanded to the CSC for findings of fact and conclusions of 
law which were never entered. (R 815, 816, 794, 768) 
The following alleged circumstances are also equally irrelevant to the question of 
who was promoted to jail sergeant in 1991. Discovering in the December 1996 letter that the 
Sheriff did not consider Shift supervisor to be a department wide rank or that they had not 
been given due credit for Shift supervisor experience in past promotional processes. The 
Sheriff in the same letter advised that the Deputies had been given consideration for their 
supervisory experience and would continue to do so. Whether promotion or eligibility 
requirements fluctuated or were disregarded. The alleged concealment of promotion 
registers. The registers have nothing to do with minimum qualifications. The Deputies knew 
who was promoted and did not need the register to know who was. Alleged assurances that 
the Deputies would be treated fairly and encouraging the Deputies to resolve their issues 
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internally. The alleged institutional pressure or determination that it would be better for their 
careers to not rock the boat. Encouraging the Deputies to apply for promotion. There simply 
are no facts alleged that have any relevance to when the Deputies first discovered or should 
have discovered they were not promoted, who was promoted, and whether the promoted 
employees met the minimum qualifications for jail sergeant. 
If the Court finds any of the above allegations relevant, the review of the record on 
whether the Deputies made the required threshold showing before the CSC is problematical. 
The discovery rule was raised by the Deputies for the first time in the District Court. 
At the beginning of the April 23,1997 hearing after Utah County's Motion to Dismiss 
was argued by the parties the CSC ruled 
With regards to the issue of the timely filing of this particular grievance, the Council 
rules that it is timely filed. We want that to be formally on the record, and we wanted 
the reasoning to be on the record also. The trigger date for the filing was December 
17, 1996, It was filed—it was a 90 day period to file, it was filed January 10 with 
Marilyn (inaudible) Personnel Director, so that matter is no longer at issue." (R1476 
33) 
The CSC also ruled in the June 30, 1997 written decision 
The Council would also like to reconfirm that we did not feel like this hearing should 
be barred because of the timeliness of filing. We felt like your discussion with Sheriff 
Bateman in December, 1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing. You 
filed within ninety days of that date, therefore, we proceeded with the hearing. 
The Deputies raise the discovery rule in an attempt for the Court to uphold the CSC's 
decision on other grounds,, In light of the imprecise CSC findings, Utah County will attempt 
to marshal the evidence in favor of a finding that the trigger date for the filing was December 
17,1996 and the discussion with Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 was the date that should 
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drive the time for filing. 
Hie Deputies' arguments at the Pre-hearing and April 23, 1997 hearings are not 
evidence and should not be considered by the court in determining whether the record 
supports a finding that the Deputies reasonably first discovered their cause of action on 
December 17, 1996, Neither should the court consider the Deputies December 17, 1996 
outline and the Sheriff s December 30,1996 response thereto which were added to the record 
over Petitioner's due process objections after the CSC decision while this matter was on 
remand. Petitioner nevertheless has marshaled these arguments and evidence if the Court 
finds them admissible. 
A. EVIDENCE/ARGUMENT SUPPORTING THE DEPUTIES CLAIMS 
Unless otherwise noted the following evidence/arguments were argued bv the 
Deputies or their counsel, or are from the Deputies' testimony. 
Pre-hearing argument-The Deputies relied in good faith on the Sheriffs promises 
that this would be made good, they believed their Sheriff when he said he would make it 
good on it and handle it internally. (R 754) The reason it was not filed in 1991 was that some 
promise was given by the Sheriff that the matter would be taken care of, the last meeting they 
had, the Sheriff said that when he said he would make good on it was in December of 1996, 
the first time that he actually in writing responded and said he would not be doing anything 
(R 752, 753) The case concerns the 1991 demotion and the ongoing testing process and 
inconsistencies that have occurred over the years. The Sheriff didn't respond at that point 
negatively to our case. (R 751) The Deputies in the two years prior to 1997 were told to bide 
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their time that it would be made right. (R 751) In 1991 a salary survey was done. The 
Deputies had to figure out for themselves that they were being disciplined and that took a 
period of time. (R 744) The Deputies understood they had to go up their chain of command 
and did not realize that they should go separately and file a formal grievance. (R 743) Their 
understanding of the policy is that you go up the chain of command. They understood that 
there's a process you do within before you go without. (R 743) The Deputies were unable 
to determine whether the candidates had been certified as being eligible and in fact they were 
not. When the register was subsequently formed, they were never given access to the 
register. That was held in confidence by the Sheriff. It was never posted, nobody actually 
knew where they were, where they placed on the register. When the Deputies filed this 
grievance and requested documentation, the Sheriff did come forth and find the registers and 
submit them to the Deputies. The Deputies were not able to gain access to the registers for 
many years until the grievance was filed. (R 742, 743) 
April 23.1997 h earing argument - Sheriff Bateman made promises to the Deputies 
that he would make it right, we can handle this internally, I'll make it right and give 
promises. (R 1476 14) The Deputies tried to be team players by believing the Sheriff when 
he says heTl make it right. (R1476 15) The Deputies relied on his promises to make it right. 
(R 1476 17) In December of 1996 the Sheriff indicated that if he could prove these 
commitments had been made he would make the situation right. The Sheriff made the 
commitment in his office that if he could find these commitments had been made that he 
would make it right not only make it right in the sense of promote us to Sergeant (R 1476 22, 
42 
23) In December of 1996 Sheriff Bateman represented to the Deputies that he would 
investigate their allegations and if he was able to determine their allegations were accurate, 
he would do what he could to make it right. (R1476 26) December 1996 was the first time 
Sheriff Bateman put in writing you are getting no relief. They relied on promises made by 
Captain Quamberg to them who was their superior. It's not quite right for the Sheriff to 
come in here and wash his hands of the matter when the people below him and yet above 
these Deputies make promises that they will be made right to appease them meanwhile the 
clock is ticking. (R 1476 30) The Deputies trusted their Sheriff when he made promises 
whether it was himself or through his subordinates who are their superiors that it would be 
made right. (R 1476 31) 
April 23.1997 hearing evidence - Sgt. Mike Morgan was supervising a number of 
people in the jail division while a testing procedure was taking place for a lateral transfer 
from other areas into patrol. An individual called him and asked him for input on questions 
he was formulating for the test. The questions were given over the phone and Sgt. Morgan 
wrote them down. After talking about the questions for some time and also about a specific 
candidate that Sgt. Morgan was supervising at the jail, the candidate's qualifications and 
whether he would make a good patrol deputy was discussed. At the end of the conversation, 
the individual said, "Well, I guess if you left these questions on your desk and somebody 
walked in and happened to see them when you weren't in there, you couldn't be held 
responsible for that." Sgt. Morgan responded, "Well, I'm not going to do that, and we went 
on and talked about a couple of other things," After the conversation, Sgt. Morgan shredded 
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the questions. Sometime later on an unspecified date, Sgt. Morgan related the experience to 
Mr. Martin in an attempt to persuade him that the testing procedures in patrol that Sgt.. 
Morgan had been involved in were one hundred percent credible, very objective and not 
subjective in trying to secure certain people. (R1476 193-196) 
May 29.1997 hearing evidence - In September or October of 1991 Mr. Martin was 
told there were no more shift supervisors, to stay where you were until the actual changes 
were made.(R 1477 17) The Department failed to establish eligibility lists or appointment 
registers and make them available to applicants. Exhibit O, the 1991 sergeant register, was 
never made public and the Deputies did not obtain it until they requested it of the Sheriff. 
Nobody had any idea where they had placed on an eligible register. They had only seen it 
in connection with the grievance. (R1477 69) People have been promoted without there ever 
being a register and positions were filled with a secret process. (R 1477 77) Over the two 
years prior to 1997, sergeant testing was exclusive to the jail and a jail only sergeant's 
position. In approximately 1995 Mr. Alexanderson informed the Sheriff that he thought it 
was unfair that he had to basically test again to try to regain the ground that he already held. 
Sheriff Bateman said he understood his position, but didn't agree with it and also said, 
Go ahead and bide your time. If you want to test for a position that comes available 
in another part of the Department, when that position becomes available you'll be 
afforded the opportunity to test." And I was willing to do that. I was willing to let 
the water under the bridge, you know, be under the bridge. I bided my time, I spun 
my wheels for another two years. There were only two processes that took place in 
1995 and 1996 and again, those were exclusive to the jail. The one in 1995 I did 
participate in, the two I think that occurred in 1996 I did not with the understanding 
that when a position became available I would be able to test for it. (R 1477 78, 79) 
Many of the registers are kept confidential. You can't get one unless you either 
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request to see it and again if I didn't get the promotion, I don't even want to look at the 
register, that's just me. In numerous promotional announcements they say that the registers 
will not be made available. They will be held in confidence. (R1477 81) Mr. Alexanderson 
responded, when being asked why he waited five years to bring this complaint "Because as 
I stated I tried to be a loyal employee I thought the Sheriff was doing the right thing. (R1477 
98-99) 
Evidence improperly submitted after the CSC decision while case on remand- On 
December 17, 1996 the Deputies met with Sheriff Bateman to discuss long held concerns 
contained in an outline (supra p. 6, 7) about promotions and possible corruption within the 
Department and requested that the Sheriff investigate and provide the Deputies a remedy. 
(R 791, 792) In Sheriff Bateman's response thereto he stated, 
The issue of automatic advancement of shift supervisors is not warranted because the 
position of shift supervisor was never a ranked position. It was rather a temporary 
solution to supervision problems in limited areas of the Sheriffs Office, primarily the 
jail. Shift supervisors were allowed to wear corporal stripes as a way of visually 
recognizing their supervisory status, but was never intended as the creation of an 
office wide ranked structure.... 
Deputy in charge and shift supervisor experience have been considered as part 
of the evaluation process and will continue to be considered 
I do find evidence of your dissatisfaction with departmental promotional policy 
that is consistent with issues raised under "inconsistencies" . . . 
Inconsistencies have occurred, but only in an attempt to be as fair and impartial 
as possible. Each time a promotional opportunity has been available, things have 
been learned that I believe have allowed us to do a better job the next time. The new 
process being put in place in 1997 will, I hope, establish a system that will eliminate 
the past inconsistencies. (R340, 341) 
B CONFLICTING AND CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE/ARGUMENT 
The foregoing argument/evidence is deficient of any relevant facts supporting a claim 
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that the Deputies did not know or could not have known of the key facts - that they were not 
promoted in December 1991, that someone who did not meet minimum qualifications had 
been and the Deputies believed they were the only applicants meeting minimum 
qualifications. The Deputies knew or were on inquiry notice of the key facts. This is amply 
demonstrated by the following evidence/argument. Unless otherwise noted, the following 
argument/evidence is from the Deputies and their Counsel. 
Pre-hearing argument- The job description that we were holding, shift supervisor, 
was attributed as sergeant in the salary survey.(R 745,746) The Deputies were left as acting 
sergeants from July of 1991 to December of 1991. (R 745) The Deputies brought up their 
complaint about the whole process or lack of process time and time again, (R 752,753) The 
grievance was made known to the Sheriff in 1991 by Mr. Martin.(R 751) Mr. Martin spoke 
with the Sheriff on several occasions personally and wrote him a long letter in April of 1992 
after it became clear what was going on. The reclassification of deputies was done in 
violation of some policies and we couldn't understand why they were violating the policies. 
Two of the shift supervisors that we served with were moved up to sergeants rank. Mr. 
Alexanderson moved out to Patrol when it was made clear to him that he was not going to 
be moved up to avoid the chagrin of having to go back on a shift. Mr. Martin went back on 
a shift and had to train his new sergeant. They brought in someone that was unqualified in 
violation of some policies that we can show. (R 745,746) In and around December of 1991 
there were complaints that are documented. Mr. Martin did not file a formal complaint at 
that time as he felt that the situation was going to right itself as soon as the promotions 
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started to become consistent and/or recognized that we were the qualified competent people 
logical for the next sergeants positions, when in fact they started opening up and changing 
the career ladder and doing some alterations that affected that whole situation and that's 
when it started to become clear, and that's when in about April of 1992 which was four 
months from the promotions. (R 743,744) The Sheriff was the only one that could answer 
certain questions and he was on notice from the get go that they had a complaint about the 
process. (R743) 
April23.1997hearing argument- Mr. Martin was told he's not allowed to wear his 
second stripe in December of 1991 the first he knew that he had been demoted.(R1476 15) 
In December 1996 was when the Sheriff beyond the letter dated 1992 put something in 
writing saying basically I'm doing nothing for you. (R1476 16) The Deputies were advised 
the job they were doing is equivalent to that of a sergeant however we are going to eliminate 
the shift supervisor position and make sergeants in those positions instead of taking the shift 
supervisors competently doing the job. They said okay we're going to open it up to eligible 
corrections specialists with other kinds of criteria with different backgrounds. They 
expanded the criteria for eligibility to get the shift sergeant position which was replacing the 
shift supervisor position. We at the time didn't think that was fair, however it was not 
portrayed to us as a disciplinary action. We said okay, we're going to reclassify everybody 
and we're going to promote from the greater pool including some correction specialists. I 
had real trouble with that at the time because here I was supervising and training and 
evaluating and managing the jail and watching over personnel and now I had to compete 
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against those personnel to get basically my old job back which was a shift supervisor now 
shift sergeant position, (R 1476 18, 19) Mr. Martin made his dissatisfactions vocal to 
Captain Quarnberg, the Bureau Chief, and Sheriff Bateman and wrote Sheriff Bateman the 
1992 letter. (R 1476 19) Mr. Martin was moved back onto a shift "Just take your rank 
you're being absorbed back onto a shift" and at that time I thought that it was wrong because 
here I had been doing the supervisory job for 4 Vi years, there's no discemable difference in 
the job description change, yet they are taking me out of the position absent disciplinary 
action or any kind of rationale I could see. (R 1476 20) At the time Mr. Martin was 
disgruntled. He was on a team and went along with it because he believed that because the 
policy said that you needed a year as a shift supervisor to be promoted, any further 
promotions that came down the pipe were going to be a shoe in because I was one of the only 
few people who had shift supervisor experience. (R 1476 21, 22) Numerous statements 
were made in shift supervisor meeting where there would be automatic advancement of the 
current shift supervisors into the position of sergeant. (R1476 22) When promises were made 
in shift supervisor meeting the Deputies were under the understanding quite rightfully that 
they were the only qualified individuals so that they were going to be the two made sergeant 
and they were not. (R 1476 28) 
April23.1997hearing evidence-By letter dated April 22,1992 Mr. Martin raised the 
following issues with Sheriff Bateman. Mr. Martin was troubled by his unreasonable 
placement on the promotion list; the most recent promotional process was a popularity 
contest based on perceptions about individual personalities and promotability instead of an 
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objective analyzation of day to day task accomplishments and true ability; the salary survey 
showed that shift supervisors in the jail were doing a job comparable to sergeants in other 
divisions and indeed attributed the sergeant rank to the shift supervisor job description with 
no significant alteration; all active shift supervisors should have been promoted to the new 
rank automatically unless there was specific cause to revoke supervisory status; shift 
supervisor corporals who were not promoted were effectively demoted. (R 907) Mr. Martin 
realized he actually had been demoted, lost rank, supervisory authority and apparently all 
recognition received as a shift supervisor; in December of 1991 Captain Quarnberg told him 
he placed second to the bottom on the final roster. He attempted to justify Mr. Martin's low 
placement by saying that he was a worker not a leader. (R 906) He takes issue with the 
promotion into a position over me of any line deputy he supervised and evaluated; his 
experience as a shift supervisor (as established in Jail Policy and Procedure 150.02) 
designates him as a more logical and qualified choice for the position of jail sergeant than 
any line deputy without shift supervisor experience, irregardless of the recent promotional 
assessment; his supervisory experience cannot be forgotten or trivialized and his promotion 
to corporal was never rescinded and must be given due consideration in any promotional 
process. (R 905) Mr. Martin could only surmise that he had been attacked behind his back 
by someone or some group with enough administrative clout to influence the promotions 
rather than strictly evaluating performances measured against standardized guidelines; 
perhaps his style of leadership, his feelings about politics, his religious beliefs, or any of the 
million other subjective perceptions became part of the criteria for evaluating him; the 
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Sheriffs Department constantly changing promotional process was transformational and 
whimsical not predictable and calculable; the promotional criteria and procedure are changed 
so much and so often creating disparity from one promotion to the next; promotional ground 
rules constantly change; the Sheriffs Department needs standardization, objective 
promoting, and to follow written policies. (R 904) He lost earned rank, recognition, 
authority and wage difference between deputy and sergeant. (R 903) 
By letter dated April 22,1992 Sheriff Bateman replied to Mr. Martin's letter. Sheriff 
Bateman responded that he was not convinced that Mr. Martin's perceptions were accurate. 
Two promotion cycles ago he was approached in writing by all individuals eligible for 
promotion at the time and under the auspices of the Deputies Association to eliminate the 
objective and competitive process the Sheriffs Department was using. It was too stressful 
and the applicants would rather the Sheriff just make the selections for the open positions. 
Sheriff Bateman stated that the majority of those being considered for promotion have been 
satisfied with the new selection process and absent feedback to the contrary he would 
continue to honor the request to not use the more objective and competitive process used in 
the past. Sheriff Bateman invited Mr. Martin to work through the Deputies Association to 
bring about a change if sentiments have changed. (R 908). 
May 29K1997 hearing evidence- In September or October of 1991 Mr. Martin was 
told there were no more shift supervisors, to stay where you were until the actual changes 
were made. (R 1477 17) At the end of December they came in with new job descriptions, 
now you can stop wearing your two stripes and promoted Bonnie Herkimer, Mark Binks, and 
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the Deputies were absorbed back onto the shifts. (R 1477 18) Mr. Alexanderson saw this 
coming when they started talking about just promoting two sergeants and made arrangements 
to go to Patrol. Mr. Martin went back on a shift and trained his new sergeant. Mr. Martin 
was told off and on for months leading up to the point where they actually said there are no 
shift supervisors. (R 1477 18) There is no discemable difference between the functions of 
shift supervisors that they're performing and the sergeants. (R 1477 19) It was Mr. 
Alexanderson9 s understanding when the news first came that shift supervisor was going to 
be eliminated that those who were serving in that capacity would be promoted to sergeant 
based on inseemingly assurances throughout the years that they had talked about upgrading 
that position to sergeant (R 1477 19-20) Dennis Howard, a patrol deputy, was promoted 
and became Mr. Martin's sergeant. (R 1477 21) According to the policies at the time and 
the job descriptions we felt that we were qualified if not more qualified than Mark Binks and 
Herkimer in as much that we were peace officer certified. We were confused because there 
was no testing. (R 1477 21-22) Mr. Martin understood the minimum qualifications of the 
jail sergeant at that time were shift supervisor for one year, peace officer certified and a 
college degree. (R 1477 22) He came to that understanding through a job description 
outlined in the Sheriffs Department Policy and Procedure Manual (Exhibit G, R 833) 
requiring peace officer certification and minimum hiring requirements of the jail. Exhibit 
G, the 1991 JPPM jail sergeant job description at the time that Herkimer and Binks were 
promoted as jail sergeants, was available to all deputies that were interested in being 
promoted to sergeant. (R 1477 22, 23) Mr. Martin understood Bonnie Herkimer was not 
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POST certified at the time of her promotion as he remembers her having to go to POST after 
that to go up and get her certification. (R 1477 30) Mr. Howard at the time of promotion 
was not a shift supervisor for a year. (R 1477 30) Mr. Martin learned Binks and Herkimer 
were promoted when he saw them wearing sergeant's rank around the time he was told 
vaguely in the control room he didn't need to wear his rank anymore. (R 1477 32) Mr. 
Howard when promoted had not served as a shift supervisor and was trained by Mr. Martin. 
(R1477 33-34) In December Captain Quamberg told Mr. Martin I view you as a worker not 
a leader so you're not getting promoted to the sergeant position. (R 1477 34) In April or 
May of 1992 Mr. Martin transferred out of the jail. He was humiliated and wanted to get out 
of the situation. (R 1477 35) When the shift supervisor position was eliminated Mr. Martin 
complained to his supervisors that what about the policy that requires one year of shift 
supervisor experience which had not been rescinded. At the time he went to his sergeant. 
He said how can they do this. They are eliminating our ranked position. They're going to put 
sergeant's in the exact same position. (R 1477 52-53) Mr. Martin has always had access 
to the Jail Manual and the Sheriffs Office Manual and the Personnel Manual. (R 1477 54) 
Mr. Alexanderson testified in December of 1991 he was called into Captain 
Quamberg's office and told the promotion list is coming out tomorrow and you're not on it. 
Prior to the time he met with Captain Quamberg he expected to receive a sergeant job based 
on numerous assurances, commitments in shift supervisor meetings. (R 1477 58) They all 
expected to become sergeants after the salary survey. The job description was rewritten. The 
job description remained the same only the title changed. (R 1477 60) Bonnie Herkimer and 
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Mark Binks were not certified peace officers when promoted to sergeant which he 
understood to be a minimum qualification. (R 1477 61-63) The Deputies submitted their 
letter and their resumes and basically thought "this is it the stripes are coming — or the 
additional stripe is coming. We've met all the requirements, we've got all the qualifications 
this is just something that is some sort of a requirement." (R 1477 64) The Deputies were 
advised in the September 6, 1991 shift supervisor meeting that shift supervisors had been 
eliminated, that everyone would remain where they were for the time being. (R 1477 70, 
109- 111) Dennis Howard, when promoted to sergeant in 1991, had correctional experience, 
did not have a college degree and had never been a shift supervisor. (R 1477 72) The same 
night Mr. Alexanderson was told he was not going to be on the promotional list he was 
offered a patrol spot and snapped it up because he was embarrassed, humiliated, had been 
promoted, had his rank revoked, reneged, negated without reason whatsoever and opted to 
save a little bit of face when they offered the opportunity and he got out of there and went 
to patrol. (R 1477 75-76) Mr. Alexanderson did not apply for sergeant openings in the two 
years prior to 1997 because over the last two years testing for the jail position of sergeant was 
exclusive to the jail. The person being promoted to the rank of sergeant when the test was 
being administered by the jail was in all likelihood going to remain in the jail for the rest of 
his career. In a conversation in the two years prior to filing the grievance Mr. Alexanderson 
informed the Sheriff that he thought it was unfair that he had to test again to try to regain the 
ground he already held. Sheriff Bateman said he understood his position, he necessarily 
didn't agree with it but he understood it (p. 44, supra; R 1477 78-79) When Mr. 
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Alexanderson was told he was not going to be promoted he was floored, tears came to his 
eyes, he said thank you got up and left. Since that time he's not been given explanations for 
not being promoted. Many of the registers were kept confidential or you can t get one unless 
you either request to see it5 and again if he didn't get the promotion he didn't even want to 
look at the register. (R 1477 80-81) 
When the Deputies requested that Sheriff Bateman forgo formal testing in 1994 Mr. 
Alexanderson refused to sign the petition saying the testing should be waived. He didn't 
think it was appropriate and instead of asserting his rights at that time he let it go. Mr. 
Alexanderson responded when being asked why he waited five years to bring this complaint 
I had conversations with the Sheriff indicating my displeasure at having to test to 
regain the ground I had held in the Jail and I was willing to let bygones be bygones, 
even to let my demotion go in order to be eligible to test when the position became 
available in an area I was interested in up to 1996 and that's what the plan was. (R 
1477 98-99) 
Mr. Binks was in the police academy in 1991 and was told that he had made sergeant a 
couple days before his actual graduation from the police academy. (R 1477 185) 
C. THE DEPUTIES KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THEIR CAUSE 
OF ACTION WHEN THEY WERE NOT PROMOTED IN DECEMBER 
1991 
Based on the foregoing facts any finding that the Deputies first knew or should have 
known of their cause of action when they met with Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 is 
clearly erroneous. By their own statements the Deputies were on notice of and felt that they 
were clearly wronged by their reclassification to corrections specialist from shift supervisor 
and failure to be promoted to sergeant in 1991. When they learned they were not promoted 
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in December of 1991, they believed they were the only qualified applicants for j ail sergeant. 
The Deputies participated in the promotion process and knew who was promoted. They had 
access to all relevant Personnel, Sheriff s Department and Jail rules, regulations, policies and 
procedures. 
The Deputies were on inquiry notice as early as August 15, 1991 when Sheriff 
Bateman, by memo notified all employees that all shift supervisors were to be eliminated, 
that those filling shift supervisor positions would automatically be reclassified to deputy 
sheriff III or corrections specialist without an associated pay loss and that sergeants' 
positions would need to be filled if the salary survey is implemented, would be open to all 
eligible employees and any eligible employee would be required to submit a resume to be 
considered. (R909, Exhibit 5). Shift supervisors were notified on August 22,1991 in a shift 
supervisor meeting that the salary survey was placed on hold and it could not be adopted until 
the County Commission approved it, but that the salary survey would most likely go into 
effect the first of October or first of the year and that promotions would be held up because 
of the salary survey, but that the Department would go ahead with promotion applications. 
(R 861, Exhibit P). Captain Quarnberg advised all shift supervisors in a shift supervisor 
meeting of September 6,1991 that there were now no shift supervisors. (R823, Exhibit A). 
Notice was given in the September 19,1991 shift supervisors' meeting that the salary survey 
was approved by the Commission. (R825, Exhibit C). Notice was given in the October 3, 
1991 shift supervisor meeting that Personnel had the list ready to go regarding promotions 
and that the list would be sent out to evaluate each person and start the interview process. 
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(R829, Exhibit D). 
The Deputies were on actual notice of the facts forming the basis of their cause of 
action in December 199L At the very least the Deputies were informed of circumstances 
sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry and did nothing for 5 years. There has been 
no showing why the Deputies could not have discovered much sooner what they claimed to 
discover from their meeting with Sheriff Bateman in 1996. 
The Deputies claim that they did not learn of their grievance until their December 
1996 meeting with Sheriff Bateman is unsupported. Even if the court considers the 
Deputies' December 17, 1996 outline presented to Sheriff Bateman in their meeting of the 
same date which was made a part of the record over Petitioner's due process objection after 
the CSC decided this matter, the outline (p. 6,7, supra) raised most, if not all of the issues 
raised by the Deputies in this matter before they met with Sheriff Bateman. 
As evidenced by the December 1996 outline and Mr. Martin's April 1992 letter, 
before the Deputies ever went to talk to Sheriff Bateman, they were on inquiry or actual 
notice asserting most if not all of the claims brought in the instant matter. However the 
claimed discoveries, Sheriff Bateman's "admissions" to "inconsistencies"on December 30th, 
1996, and the alleged discovery of testing irregularities, are not re levant or key facts shedding 
light on who was promoted in 1991 and their minimum qualifications. The Deputies 
complained about testing procedures far before December of 1996 as evidenced by the 
complaints regarding testing procedures in Mr.-Martin's April 22, 1992 letter and Mr. 
Alexanderson's refusal to sign a waiver of testing procedures in 1994. They were put on 
56 
inquiry notice long before their meeting with the Sheriff in December of 1996. 
The Deputies discovered nothing in their discussion with Sheriff Bateman in 
December of 1996 which they could not have previously discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence had they pursued their claims after the 1991 and subsequent promotional 
processes. There is nothing in the record to show what key facts the Deputies learned in or 
after their meeting with Sheriff Bateman, and why whatever is alleged to have been learned 
in or after the meeting with Sheriff Bateman should not have been discovered long ago 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
Where the circumstances are such as to suggest to a person of ordinary intelligence 
the probability that he has been defrauded, the duty of inquiry arises, and if he omits 
that inquiry when it would have developed the truth, and shuts his eyes to the facts 
which call for investigation, knowledge of the fraud will be imputed to him'. 
Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah App. 1996) 
Through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the Deputies could have and should 
have investigated whether they were correctly reclassified to corrections specialists when the 
shift supervisor position was eliminated, whether appropriate procedures were followed in 
the 1991 and subsequent sergeants promotions and whether individuals promoted to sergeant 
in the jail or elsewhere possessed necessary minimum qualifications. The Deputies knew 
who was promoted and participated in the processes. The Deputies could have made a 
request under the Government Records Access Management Act for any documents 
including eligibility and promotion registers they felt were necessary to their investigation. 
Registers were not concealed as the Deputies did not request them. There is no evidence that 
they requested registers and were turned down. They could have obtained copies of the 
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revised job descriptions containing minimum job qualifications. There is no claim that the 
County concealed any of these facts from the Deputies. Everything necessary to pursue their 
claims was known or easily available to the Deputies in December 1991. Mr. Martin, in his 
April 1992 letter to Sheriff Bateman, refers to JPPM § 150, the very section the Deputies 
claim was violated in 1991 and subsequent promotions. (R905, Exhibit 2). Yet no claim was 
filed for more than 5 years. Certainly an impermissible time period given the three month 
limitation of actions. 
The Deputies as early as August of 1991 but no later than December 1991 were on 
inquiry notice. Had they investigated the matter then as they did in 1996, they could then 
have decided to bring a claim within the limitations period at a time when the memories of 
the personnel director, Sheriff, and Sheriffs personnel involved in the promotion process 
were fresh, prior to the loss of registers and documents used in the promotional process, prior 
to memories fading, evidence being lost, and witnesses being unavailable. (R 1476, 145, 
146. R 1477 166, 167, 170, 174) 
Because the Deputies knew of and should reasonably have known of the existence of 
the grievance when they were not promoted, or on or before Mr. Martin's April 1992 letter, 
or two years prior to bringing the cause of action when Mr. Alexanderson approached the 
Sheriff regarding jail sergeant promotions, the discovery rule is not applicable to extend the 
limitation of actions from commencing in December of 1991. The same is true for all alleged 
deficiencies in promotional processes or qualifications of candidates promoted. Instead oi 
pursuing their claims the Deputies chose to do nothing. They felt it better to not rock the 
58 
boat than to assert their claimed rights and having made that decision, cannot now change 
their mind and attempt to revive long expired claims. Given the duty of inquiry, the Deputies 
did not with reasonable diligence pursue their grievance. 
The Deputies failed to make the initial showing that they did not know of and could 
not reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action in time to file a claim 
within the three month limitation period. Having failed to make this initial showing, the 
Court should not consider whether the discovery rule is applicable. 
VI THE FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT PRONG OF THE DISCOVERY 
RULE IS NOT SATISFIED. 
If the Court determines the Deputies did not know or should not have known of their 
cause of action until December 1996, the discovery rule applies "where the Defendant 
concealed the facts or misled the claimant, and as a result, the claimant did not become aware 
of the cause of action until after the limitation period had run." Warren v. Provo City Corp.. 
838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992) 
. . . The concealment version of the discovery rule is essentially a claim of equitable 
estoppel, whereby a defendant who causes a delay in bringing a cause of action is 
estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense to the action. As is 
true in all cases of equitable estoppel for the doctrine to be invoked, a showing must 
be made that under the circumstances the party claiming estoppel has acted in a 
reasonable manner. Therefore in order to invoke the concealment version of the 
discovery rule, it must be shown that given the defendant's actions, a reasonable 
plaintiff would not have brought suit within the statutory period. Warren v. Provo 
City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1129, 1130 (Utah 1992). 
For the concealment prong of the discovery rule to apply, a plaintiff must "make a 
prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrate that given the 
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the claim earlier". 
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Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 578, 579(Utah App. 1996) 
From the facts previously discussed there is no claim that the Sheriff Department 
fraudulently concealed any key facts about minimum job qualifications, when and who was 
promoted or what their qualifications were. The Deputies were on inquiry notice and had 
access to all relevant rules, regulations, policies and procedures. The Deputies simply cannot 
make the required primae facie showing of fraudulent concealment of key facts. For the 
discovery rule to apply the Court must find that the Deputies did not become aware of key 
facts because of the Sheriffs concealment or misleading conduct occurring before the 
limitation period ran. The Deputies do not allege that any concealment or misleading 
conduct prevented them from becoming aware of who was promoted or whether they held 
the minimum qualifications for the job. 
Defendant's allege that they were not given access to eligibility or promotional 
registers. A review of promotional registers or eligibility lists is not relevant as they would 
not have been helpful to determine who was promoted, what the minimum qualifications 
were for promotion and whether the promoted individual met minimum qualifications. There 
is no evidence that the Deputies pursued the procedures and remedies available under 
GRAMA to obtain copies of promotion or eligibility registers or that they even requested 
registers. The Deputies had access to job descriptions, the JPPM, and the OPMRR, and 
could have ascertained with reasonable diligence job minimum qualifications and whether 
the promoted sergeants met those qualifications. 
The Deputies claim their inaction to be a result of assurances of department 
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management that they would be "treated fairly" and "things made right". The Deputies 
cannot reasonably rely on the alleged assurances of Department management, (see argument 
of Mr. Alexanderson at R 1476 22 alleging assurances made in shift supervisor meetings in 
1991) made before the limitation of actions commenced when the 1991 promotions were 
made. Sheriff Bateman had the final say in recommending who would be promoted. Nor 
are any such statements identified as occurring within the limitations period. Mr. 
Alexanderson argued at the April 1997 Pre-hearing and later testified that Sheriff Bateman 
told him to bide his time and things would be made right in the two previous years. This 
alleged statement did not occur within any limitations period and cannot form the basis for 
a finding of fraudulent concealment, or misleading conduct. 
The alleged repeated assurances that they would be treated fairly as a result of the 
reclassification and that the Sheriff personally assured them he would make things right 
concerned complaints the Deputies were already making and aware of. The allegations of 
being treated fairly and make things right are also vague. Were these allegations made in the 
context of promotions of the Deputies to sergeant or the procedures of future promotions? 
While the Deputies make vague allegations of repeated assurances of being treated fairly and 
that the Sheriff would make things right, the evidence cannot place any such assurances 
within a limitation period following a sergeant promotion. 
After the Deputies were not promoted in 1991 the record contains only three 
communications between the Deputies and anyone in Sheriff Department management. The 
first was April 2251992 when the Sheriff responded to Mr. Martin's letter of the same date. 
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Therein (Exhibit 3, R 908) the Sheriff told Mr. Martin he was not convinced that Mr. 
Martin's perceptions were accurate. There were no promises of promotions, that things 
would be made right, or favorable treatment in the correspondence. Exhibit 3 is a complete 
denial of Mr. Martin's April 22, 1992 letter. The next conversation is detailed by Mr. 
Alexanderson. Around the 1995 sergeants promotions he had a conversation with the Sheriff 
wherein the Sheriff expressed that he did not agree with Mr. Alexanderson's representation 
that he was having to retest to regain ground he already held. The Sheriff said he understood 
his position but did not agree with it and advised "Bide your time and when an opportunity 
becomes available to test in another area of the Department you'll be allowed to test." This 
was no promise of promotion or that things would be made right. The third conversation 
occurred on December 17, 1996. The Sheriff indicated he would investigate the Deputies 
claims and if he believed they were meritorious he would do what he could to make it right. 
However this conversation occurred far too long after 1991 or any promotion to have any 
effect on a limitation of actions. The Deputies' claims of relying on repeated assurances of 
favorable treatment are not reasonable in light of the foregoing conversations. In fact to do 
so would violate merit principles by not considering all qualified applicants for a promotion. 
UCA 17-33-5(3)(b)(xi). None of the conversations or alleged repeated false assurances can 
be established to have occurred within any specific limitation period, nor had the effect of 
concealing key facts or misleading the Deputies. 
The Deputies claimed "institutional pressure" to resolve issues internally or their 
determination that they were unlikely to find promotional success if they were perceived 
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unwilling to work within the system does not amount to concealing or misleading conduct 
preventing them from discovering key facts. Nor does urging the Deputies to apply for 
promotions. Nor does a promise to treat them fairly or a promise of promotion. Nor does 
the alleged fluctuation of promotion and eligibility requirements. 
Reliance on concealment of promotion irregularities is unjustified. The Defendant's 
participated in and were familiar with promotion processes or whether a promotional process 
occurred and knew who was promoted. 
The Deputies allegations are further directly controverted by Sheriff Bateman's 
statements (R 1477 at 26), where he says that he never said that he would automatically 
promote the Deputies, but that in December of 1996, he told them if their allegations were 
accurate, he would do what he could to make it right. Captain Quarnberg, said he was never 
approached by the Deputies about why they were not sergeants. (R 1476 132). Also 
showing any reliance on alleged representations to be unreasonable is Mr. Alexanderson's 
conversation with Sheriff Bateman in 1995.(R 1477 78, 79, supra p.42, 43) Besides 
occurring long after and outside of any limitations period, the Sheriffs statements are not a 
promise to promote, to make things right or an attempt to keep the Deputies from filing their 
grievance. 
The record does not contain facts sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of 
fraudulent concealment or misleading conduct which prevented the Deputies from being 
aware of key facts. There is nothing in the record to show that the County concealed facts 
or engaged in misleading conduct to prevent the Plaintiffs from discovering key facts or lull 
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the Deputies into sleeping on their rights. The Deputies5 failure to investigate is the only 
reason for any claimed failure to discover. 
No statements were made within limitations periods upon which the Deputies relied 
in not timely bringing this matter before the Council. Even if such statements were made, 
reliance thereon was not reasonable in light of Sheriff Bateman's April 22,1992 letter to Mr. 
Martin and his conversation with Mr. Alexanderson concerning the 1995 promotions. 
VII THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES PRONG OF THE DISCOVERY 
RULE IS NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS. 
A prerequisite to the application of the discovery rule is ignorance by the plaintiff of 
the facts giving rise to the cause of action. To invoke the exceptional circumstances 
version of the discovery rule, the claimants must make a threshold showing that they 
did not know and could not reasonably have known of the existence of a cause of 
action. In fact, the requirement would seem a definitional prerequisite to reliance on 
any version of the discovery rule judicial or legislative. 
O'Neal v. Division of Family Services. 821 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Utah 1991). As discussed 
above, the Deputies were on notice of their cause of action when they were not promoted in 
1991 and cannot make the threshold showing that they did not know and could not 
reasonably have known of the existence of the facts giving rise to a cause of action. The 
court, therefore, should not proceed further to examine whether the exceptional 
circumstances prong of the discovery rule applies. If the Court determines otherwise, the 
exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule does not apply for the following 
reasons. 
The exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule is applicable 
. . . in situations where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showin g 
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that the Defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action." 
Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc.. 920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah App. 1996) 
The ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional 
circumstances that render the application of a statute of limitations irrational 
or unjust is a balancing test . . . The balancing test weighs the hardship 
imposed on the claimant by the application of the statute of limitations against 
any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the passage of time Some 
factors this court considers in applying this test include whether the 
defendant's problems caused by the passage of time are greater than the 
plaintiffs, whether the defendant performed a technical service that the 
plaintiff cannot reasonably have been expected to evaluate, and whether the 
claim has aged to the point that witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot 
be found, and the parties cannot remember basic events. 
Sevev vs. Security Title Company. 902 P.2d 629,636 (Utah 1995). The alleged hardship on 
the Deputies from applying the limitation of actions would be not promoting the Deputies 
and the extra pay associated with a promotion. This hardship is somewhat minimized by the 
fact that the Deputies did not participate in the 1997 and subsequent sergeant's promotional 
process and Mr. Alexanderson did not test in 1996. The prejudice to Utah County resulting 
from the passage of time is significant however. The Utah County personnel directors from 
1991 through 1996 no longer work at the County. One has moved to Arizona, the other 
retired. Documents reflecting job announcements, promotional registers, promotional tests 
and or processes no longer existed or could not be found. The County introduced into 
evidence all documents found relating to Sheriffs Department sergeants' promotions. 
Documents which could have helped reconstruct the prior promotional processes and 
especially the 1991 promotional process could not be found. Further, Sheriff Bateman could 
not recall the 1991 promotional process, and neither could Lieutenant John Carlson nor 
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Captain Owen Quarnberg. (R 1476, 145, 146. R 1477 166, 167, 170, 174) 
The exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule has applied in only two (2) 
cases since 1981. In Sevey, Security Title Company failed to perfect a security interest in 
water shares and the water shares were lost. Sevey. at 636. The second case, Clinger v. 
Kightlv. 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990) involved a surveyor who had negligently surveyed 
property. The buyers in that case had no reason to suspect that the survey was inaccurate. 
The technical aspects of surveys and perfecting security interests are not present in this case. 
Utah County did not perform a technical service that the Deputies could not have reasonably 
been expected to evaluate. 
Because this case does not involve a technical service and the prejudice to Utah 
County resulting from the passage of time outweighs the alleged hardship imposed on the 
Deputies by the application of the limitation of actions, the exceptional circumstances prong 
does not apply to extend the limitation of actions in this instance. 
VIIL NEITHER ESTOPPEL NOR THE DISCOVERY RULE CAN BE RELIED ON 
BY THE DEPUTIES 
The concealment version of the discovery rule is essentially a claim of equilable 
estoppel, whereby a defendant who causes a delay in bringing a cause of action is 
estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense to the action. Warren 
v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P2d 1125, 1129, 1130 (Utah 1992). 
Under the Court's traditional analysis, to estop a party from claiming the limitation 
of actions as a defense, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's action caused plaintiffs 
failure to bring a timely suit. The elements of estoppel are 
(1) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim 
later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken 
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on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to act; (3) injury 
to the plaintiff that would result from allowing the defendant to contradict or 
repudiate such statement, admission, act or failure to act. S & G. Inc. v. 
Intermountain Power Agency 913 P.2d 735, 741, 742 (Utah 1996). 
Any such claim of the discovery rule or estoppel fails because "Utah recognizes the 
general rule that estoppel may not be asserted against a governmental entity." Weese v. 
Davis County, 834 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 1992). 
Any claim that Utah County is estopped from asserting the limitation of actions 
defense also fails for the reason that the Deputies cannot point to any statement made within 
the applicable limitations period for the 1991 or subsequent promotional processes upon 
which the Deputies could reasonably rely in not pursuing their claims within any given three 
month limitation period. Even if all arguments and evidence relevant to the limitation of 
actions issue are considered, those arguments are insufficient to establish estoppel or support 
the application of the discovery rule. 
At the Pre-hearing opposing counsel alleged that the Deputies were made promises 
that this would be made good, that it would be made good and handled internally, there were 
repeated complaints to the Sheriff from the Deputies, that the Sheriff said he would make 
good on it in 1996, and that the first time the Sheriff said he would do nothing was in 
December of 1996. Counsel further represented that they were told to bide their time and it 
would be made right, that they were given notice that further testing would be suspended 
until this matter was settled. (R752-754) Argument at the April 23, 1997 hearing alleged 
promises that the Sheriff would make it right, it would be handled internally, and that they 
relied on promises made by Captain Quarnberg and people below the Sheriff that it will be 
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made right (R 1476 14, 16, 17, 30), 
Even assuming for the point of argument that these representations are true, the 
Deputies can point to no statements made in the three months following the 1991 promotions 
or three months following any promotions in which the Deputies were told that this matter 
would "be made right or handled internally". The statements that this would be "made good 
or made right" are vague promises upon which reliance would not be reasonable. As Sheriff 
Bateman made final promotion recommendations, his statements only could be reasonably 
relied on. 
The representation that they were given notice that there would be no further 
sergeant's testing until the matter was settled was in reference to the 1997 sergeant's 
promotions from which the Deputies withdrew. The time frame of these alleged statements 
is limited by other statements. At the Pre-hearing, Counsel alleges the Sheriff said he would 
make good on it in 1996. (R754) At the Pre-hearing Mr. Alexanderson, said "Promises were 
made by the Sheriff numerous times over the last two years." (R751) The arguments of the 
Deputies are simply too vague to place a promise of the Sheriff within a specific three month 
time period after a hiring decision was made. The alleged promises to make it right or not 
promote until the Deputies issue was settled were not made until 1995 and 1996, even 
according to their allegations. This is far too long after the 1991 promotional process to have 
any effect in estopping the County from asserting the limitation of actions contained in the 
PRR. Any reliance thereon would be unreasonable in light of the time period which passed 
between the promotional processes and the filing of the grievance in 1997 and also in light 
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of the Sheriff Bateman's response to Mr. Martin's 1992 letter. (R 903-908, Exhibits 2, 3). 
The Deputies5 allegations are further directly controverted by Sheriff Bateman's 
statements (R 14769 26) where he says that he never said that he would automatically 
promote the Deputies, but that in December of 1996, he told them if their allegations were 
accurate, he would do what he could to make it right. Captain Quarnberg, said he was never 
approached by the Deputies about why they were not sergeants. (R 1476, 132). Also, 
showing reliance on any alleged representations to be unreasonable is the conversation Mr. 
Alexanderson had with the Sheriff in early 1995 (R 1476 78, 79), where the Sheriff said he 
understood Mr. Alexanderson's position, but didn't necessarily agree with it. There was no 
promise to promote or make things right. In fact to just promote the Deputies would violate 
merit principles by not considering all qualified applicants. 
IX IN THE EVENT THE COURT DETERMINES THE DEPUTIES' 
GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY THE COURT SHOULD REMAND THIS CASE 
FOR CONSIDERATION ON THE MERITS 
Petitioner presented several other meritorious arguments to the District Court in this 
matter including the Deputies meeting with Sheriff Bateman in December, 1996 was not an 
occurrence with in the meaning of the 3 month limitation of actions; the JPPM did not 
constitute an implied contract; the disclaimer in the JPPM prevented it from becoming an 
implied contract; shift supervisor experience and peace officer certification were not jail 
sergeant minimum qualifications; competitive testing was not required; the shift supervisor 
position was not equivalent with the sergeant position; the Deputies failed to prove their case 
by substantial legally competent evidence in the record, the award of back pay and promotion 
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were inconsistent with the CSC's finding that the Deputies never were sergeant, the CSC 
lacked jurisdiction; the CSC's recommendation was not binding; that the remedy was not 
appropriate; the Renn standard of review did not apply; the CSC is not entitled to deference; 
opposed the application of the discovery rule on estoppel and on the merits; compliance with 
merit principles, state laws, and personnel rules and regulations; that the JPPM should be 
interpreted in light of the elimination of the shift supervisor position and revised sergeant job 
descriptions; failure to mitigate damages; and prospective relief. (R 259-288,410-479) 
The district court Memorandum Decision deciding this case held the gross and 
flagrant abuse of discretion standard inapplicable and accorded the CSC broad deference in 
its findings of fact, reviewing the CSC's conclusions of law for correctness. (R 1460) Prior 
to dismissing the case on limitation of actions grounds, the Court unnecessarily addressed 
merit principles, finding the County's testing procedures arbitrary and violative of merit 
principles. The District Court found "sufficient evidence to uphold the Council's finding that 
the testing procedures were at best inconsistent, and very likely involved subjective criteria 
to the point of being arbitrary and violative of merit principles ."(emphasis added) (R1459). 
"Taken together, this court is persuaded that there is sufficient evidence to support 
Respondents' claim that the County deviated from a regular process of promotion based on 
merit principles. Therefore the findings of the Council on this issue will not be over 
turned."(emphasis added) (R1457). The final order entered by the court, which the Deputies 
did not object to, states that the CSC decision is reversed and the Deputies' claims dismissed 
for failure to timely file their grievances. (R1461,1462) The Deputies appealed the District 
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Court's Order Granting Petition for Extraordinary Relief. (R 1473) 
Because this case was decided on the limitation of actions there was no need for the 
district court to reach the merits and address the issue of merit principles. The court's 
discussion of merit principles is dicta, should not have been reached and unnecessary to the 
decision of this matter. The only issue before the Court of Appeals was the limitation of 
actions determination, and this matter should have been remanded for a decision on the 
merits to the district court. 
In Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818P.2d23(Utah App. 1991) the appellant's 
termination from Salt Lake County was upheld by a CSC and the district court. The 
appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals which noted that it would consider the 
administrative proceeding as if the appeal were a direct appeal, giving no deference to the 
district court's review since the Court of Appeals is just as capable of a review on the record 
as the district court. IcL 26. Unlike the instant matter, the Tolman appeal involved denial 
of the entire appeal, not granting of an appeal on limitation of actions grounds as in this case. 
The guidance from Tolman was the deference afforded the district court, not what was before 
it on appeal. Clearly the only issue before the Court of Appeals in this case was the 
limitation of actions. The order appealed from did not address the merits, nor did the issues 
stated in the Deputies' docketing statement and briefs below. The fact that no deference is 
given to the district court by the appellate court does not change the rules regarding what was 
before the court on appeal. If the Deputies had desired, they could have objected to the 
district court order and requested the merit principles dicta included in the order. However, 
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no such objection to the order was made. In any event the dicta only addressed testing 
procedures, which would have only entitled the Deputies to set promotions aside, not to 
promotion and back pay. Nowhere does the Memorandum Decision say the Deputies were 
entitled to promotion and back pay. 
There was nothing to cross appeal in the district court order. The merit principles 
discussion was unnecessary to the decision, not determinative of the case and failed to 
address the Petitioner' s other significant issues raised below. The merit principles discussion 
did not address the key issue of what the minimum qualifications were, which has not been 
decided by any court to date. While the Court of Appeals gave no deference to the district 
court ruling and was in as good a position to review the case as the District Court, it does not 
follow that it should review the merits when the merits were not reached by the District 
Court. Requiring Petitioner to appeal dicta contained in a Memorandum Decision would 
require appellate courts to review issues not decided by lower courts and disfavors judicial 
economy. 
By failing to remand this case for further proceedings on the merits, the Court of 
Appeals has deprived Petitioner of its constitutionally protected day in court. Utah County 
has been deprived of its day in court, access to the court and due process to determine what 
the minimum qualifications for promotion to jail sergeant were in 199 land thereby whether 
the Deputies should have been promoted. Both the due process clause of article I section 
7 and the open courts provision of article I section 11 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that 
litigants will have their day in court. Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 6 K 38,44 P3d 
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663, 673. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law. Article I, section 7, Utah Constitution; United States Constitution 5th and 14th 
Amendments. Article I section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a party. 
The analysis to determine a denial of a day in court is the same under the due process and 
open courts provisions. Miller, f^ 38. Both the due process clause of article I section 7 and 
the open courts provision of article I section 11 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that 
litigants will have this open day in court. Due process and open court provisions dictate that 
at a minimum there should be a determination of the central issues in this case, what the 
minimum qualifications were for promotion to jail sergeant in 1991 and why. To date, no 
court has determined this issue. Utah law maintains a policy that "resolves doubts in favor 
of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy." Celebrity Club 
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d 1293,1296 (Utah 1997) (quoting Carman 
v. Slavens. 546 P.2d 601,603 (Utah 1976)). "At a minimum, a day in court means that each 
party shall be afforded the opportunity to present claims and defenses, and have them 
properly adjudicated on the merits according to the facts and the law." Miller, If 41. 
Respondent's case has not been properly adjudicated on the merits according to the facts and 
the law as the key issues central to this case have never been decided. 
The minimum qualifications for jail sergeant define what facts are relevant to the 
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limitation of actions question and are determinative of the case on the merits. The Court of 
Appeals failure to remand this case for this determination violates Utah County 5s due process 
and open court rights. If the Court finds the Deputies timely filed their grievance, the Court 
should, in the alternative and in the interests of finality, determine this case on the merits, or 
remand this matter to the district court to address the merits, or remand this matter giving 
prospective effect only to any ruling that Petitioner should have cross appealed the district 
court memorandum decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing, the CSC decision should be reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion, reviewing questions of law for correctness and reversing clearly erroneous 
findings of fact. In light of the CSC three month limitation of actions it was clearly 
erroneous for the CSC to find that the trigger date for purposes of the three month limitation 
of actions was the Deputies5 December, 1996 conversation with Sheriff Bateman. Based on 
their own statements, the Deputies knew or should have known of their cause of action in 
December of 1991 when they learned they were not promoted. There is no evidence to 
support a finding that Petitioner participated in concealment or misleading conduct 
preventing the Deputies from discovering key facts—1991 jail sergeant minimum 
qualifications, that they were not promoted and that someone else not meeting minimum 
qualifications was. The Deputies cannot satisfy the required threshold showing that they 
neither knew nor should have known of their grievance before December, 1996, or a primae 
facie showing of concealment or misleading conduct preventing the Deputies from 
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discovering key facts during the limitation period. 
Because this case does not involve a technical service, witnesses were unavailable, 
Petitioner's witnesses could not remember basic facts, and evidence was lost, the application 
of the exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule is not warranted. Estoppel is 
not available against Utah County and no inconsistent statements were made within or 
outside of limitation periods upon which the Deputies reasonably relied in not filing the 
grievance within the three month limitation. 
The Court should therefore reverse the CSC and uphold the decision of the district 
court dismissing this action for the Deputies failure to timely file their grievance within three 
months of its occurrence. Should the Court find the grievance was timely filed, this matter 
in the alternative should be remanded to the district court to consider Utah County's other 
significant arguments, or in the interests of finality determine this case on the merits, or 
remand this matter giving prospective effect only to any ruling that Petitioner should have 
cross appealed the district court memorandum decision. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of February, 2004* 
M. CORT GRIFFIN TV 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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(b) advise the county legislative and executive bodies 
on the use of human resources; 
(c) develop and implement programs for the improve-
ment of employee effectiveness, such as training, safety, 
health, counseling, and welfare; 
(d) investigate periodically the operation and effect of 
this law and of the policies made under it and report 
findings and recommendations to the county legislative 
body; 
(e) establish and maintain records of all employees in 
the county service, setting forth as to each employee class, 
title, pay or status, and other relevant data; 
(f) make an annual report to the county legislative 
body regarding the work of the department; and 
(g) apply and carry out this law and the policies under 
it and perform any other lawful acts that are necessary to 
carry out the provisions of this law. 
(3) (a) (i) The director shall issue personnel rules for the 
county. 
(ii) The county legislative body may approve, 
amend, or reject those rules before they are imple-
mented, 
(b) The rules shall provide for: 
(i) recruiting efforts to be planned and carried out 
in a manner that assures open competition, with 
special emphasis to be placed on recruiting efforts to 
attract minorities, women, handicapped, or other 
groups that are substantially underrepresented in 
the county work force to help assure they will be 
among the candidates from whom appointments are 
made;-N 
(/(ii) the establishment of job related minimum re-
quirements wherever practical, which all successful 
candidates shall be required to meet in order to be 
eligible for consideration for appointment or promo-
tion; 
(iii) selection procedures that include consider-
ation of the relative merit of each applicant, a job 
related method of determining the eligibility or ineli-
gibility of each applicant, and a valid, reliable, and 
objective system of ranking eligibles according to 
their qualifications and merit; 
(iv) certification procedures that insure equitable 
consideration of an appropriate number of the most 
qualified eligibles based on the ranking system; 
(v) appointments to positions in the career service 
by selection from the most qualified eligibles certified 
on eligible lists established in accordance with Sub-
sections (iii) and (iv); 
(vi) noncompetitive appointments in the occa-
sional instance where there is evidence that open or 
limited competition is not practical, such as for un-
skilled positions for which there are no minimum job 
requirements; 
(vii) limitation of competitions at the discretion of 
the director for appropriate positions to facilitate 
employment of qualified applicants with a substan-
tial physical or mental impairment, or other groups 
protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; 
(viii) permanent appointment for entry to the ca-
reer service which shall be contingent upon satisfac-
tory performance by the employee during a period of 
six months, with the probationary period extendable 
for a period not to exceed six months for good cause, 
but with the condition that the probationary em-
ployee may appeal directly to the council any undue 
prolongation of the period designed to thwart merit 
principles; 
(ix) temporary, provisional, or other noncareer ser-
vice appointments, which may not be used as a way of 
defeating the purpose of the career service and may 
not exceed 90 days, with the period extendable for a 
period not to exceed an additional 90 days for good 
cause; 
(x) lists of eligibles normally to be used, if avail-
able, for filling temporary positions, and short term 
emergency appointments to be made without regard 
to the other provisions of law to provide for mainte-
nance of essential services in an emergency situation 
where normal procedures are not practical, these 
emergency appointments not to exceed 90 days, with 
that period extendable for a period not to exceed an 
additional 90 days for good cause; 
^gj) promotion of employees to higher level posi-
tions in such a manner that eligible permanent 
career service employees are considered and it is 
adequately assured that all persons promoted are 
qualified for the position; 
(xii) recognition of the equivalency of other merit 
processes by waiving, at the discretion of the director, 
the open competitive examination for placement in 
the career service positions who were originally se-
lected through a competitive examination process in 
another governmental entity, the individual in those 
cases, to serve a probationary period; 
(xiii) preparation, maintenance, and revision of a 
position classification plan for all positions in the 
career service, based upon similarity of duties per-
formed and responsibilities assumed, so that the 
same qualifications may reasonably be required for, 
and the same schedule of pay may be equitably 
applied to, all positions in the same class, the com-
pensation plan, in order to maintain a high quality 
public work force, to take into account the responsi-
bility and difficulty of the work, the comparative pay 
and benefits needed to compete in the labor market 
and to stay in proper alignment with other similar 
governmental units in the state, and other factors; 
(xiv) keeping records of performance on all employ-
ees in the career service and requiring consideration 
of performance records in determining salary in-
creases, any benefits for meritorious service, promo-
tions, the order of layoffs and reinstatements, demo-
tions, discharges, and transfers; 
(xv) establishment of a plan governing layoffs re-
sulting from lack of funds or work, abolition of posi-
tions, or material changes in duties or organization, 
and governing reemployment of persons so laid off, 
taking into account with regard to layoffs and reem-
ployment the relative ability, seniority, and merit of 
each employee; 
C(xvi)/establishment of a plan for resolving em-
ployee grievances and complaints with final and 
binding decisions; 
(xvii) establishment of disciplinary measures such 
as suspension, demotion in rank or grade, or dis-
charge, such measures to provide for presentation of 
charges, hearing rights, and appeals for all perma* 
nent employees in the career service to the career 
service council; 
(xviii) establishment of a procedure for employee 
development and improvement of poor performance; 
(xix) establishment of hours of work, holidays, and 
attendance requirements in various classes of posi-
tions in the career service; 
(xx) establishment and publicizing of fringe ben-
efits such as insurance, retirement, and leave pro-
grams; and 
643 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65C 
be construed to prohibit the court from ruling upon the 
petition based upon a dispositive motion. 
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person 
alleged to be restrained will be removed from the court's 
jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before com-
pliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the court 
shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the 
respondent before the court to be dealt with according to 
law. Pending a determination of the petition, the court 
may place the person alleged to have been restrained in 
the custody of such other persons as may be appropriate. 
(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the 
respondent cannot be found, or if it appears that a person 
other than the respondent has custody of the person 
alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any other 
process issued by the court may be served on the person 
having custody in the manner and with the same effect as 
if that person had been named as respondent in the 
action. 
(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone 
having custody of the person alleged to be restrained 
avoids service of the hearing order or attempts wrongfully 
to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction, the 
sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. 
The sheriff shall forthwith bring the person arrested 
before the court to be dealt with according to law. 
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event 
that the court orders a hearing, the court shall hear the 
matter in a summary fashion and shall render judgment 
accordingly. The respondent or other person having cus-
tody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained 
or shall state the reasons for failing to do so. The court 
may nevertheless direct the respondent to bring before it 
the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner 
waives the right to be present at the hearing, the court 
shall modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing 
order shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form or any 
misdescription in the order or the petition, if enough is 
stated to impart the meaning and intent of the proceeding 
to the respondent. 
(c) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public au-
thority. 
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The at-
torney general may, and when directed to do so by the 
governor shall, petition the court for relief on the grounds 
enumerated in this paragraph. Any person who is not 
required to be represented by the attorney general and 
who is aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumer-
ated in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph may petition 
the court under this paragraph if (A) the person claims to 
be entitled to an office unlawfully held by another or (B) if 
the attorney general fails to file a petition under this 
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A 
petition filed by a person other than the attorney general 
under this paragraph shall be brought in the name of the 
petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an 
undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment 
for costs and damages that may be recovered against the 
petitioner in the proceeding. The sureties shall be in the 
form for bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be 
granted: (A) where a person usurps, intrudes into, or 
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether civil 
or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation 
created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a 
public officer does or permits any act that results in a 
the state of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or 
renewal of corporations; or (E) where any corporation has 
forfeited or misused its corporate rights, privileges or 
franchises. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a 
petition, the court may require that notice be given to 
adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may 
issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to 
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also 
grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms of 
Rule 65A. 
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to 
comply with duty; actions by Board of Pardons and 
Parole. 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose 
interests are threatened by any of the acts enumerated in 
this paragraph may petition the court for relief. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be 
granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative 
agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or 
person has failed to perform an act required by law as a 
duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an inferior court, 
administrative agency, corporation or person has refused 
the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to 
which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where the Board of 
Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed 
to perform an act required by constitutional or statutory 
law. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a 
petition, the court may require that notice be given to 
adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may 
issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to 
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct 
the inferior court, administrative agency, officer, corpora-
tion or other person named as respondent to deliver to the 
court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The 
court may also grant temporary relief in accordance with 
the terms of Rule 65A. 
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceed-
ings are judicial in nature, the court's review shall not 
extend further than to determine whether the respondent 
has regularly pursued its authority. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991; May 1, 1993; July 1, 
1996.) 
Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief. 
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all peti-
tions for post-conviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
(b) Commencemen t a n d venue . The proceeding shall be 
commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the district 
court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was 
entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by the 
court. The court may order a change of venue on its own 
motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court 
may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the 
convenience of the parties or witnesses. 
(c) Conten t s of the pe t i t ion . The petition shall set forth 
all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of 
the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the 
legality of the conviction or sentence may not be raised in 
subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The 
petition shall state: 
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the 
place of incarceration; 
lack of support for any political party, committee, 
organization, agency, or person engaged in a 
political activity. 
5. No officer or employee may engage in any political 
activity during the hours of employment nor shall 
any person solicit political contributions from 
County employees during hours of employment for 
political purposes, but nothing in this section 
shall preclude voluntary contribution by a County 
employee to the party or candidate of the 
employee's choice. 
6. Nothing contained in this section shall be 
construed to permit partisan political activity of 
any County employee who is prevented or restricted 
from engaging in such political activity by the 
provision of the Federal Hatch Act. 
Appeal Procedure. 
1. Any Career Service employee who has completed a 
Schedule B probationary period or a promotional 
trial period having a grievance over merit 
principles may appeal to the Career Service 
Council. The employee must file a written notice 
with the Personnel Director within three (3) months 
from the date of the occurrence. Procedures 
outlined by the Career Service Council will then be 
followed. Exception: Career service employees 
appealing discharge must do so within 10 working 
days as outlined in this section (F.8.). 
2. The section regarding Constructive Discipline and 
Appeal Procedure applies only to Career service 
employees who have completed their probationary 
period. However, employees who are in a 
promotional trial period cannot appeal a 
reassignment to their former grade and step. 
Constructive Discipline and Appeal Procedure. 
1. The primary purpose of disciplinary action is to 
change negative employee behavior. When discipline 
can be handled in a positive manner, an employee is 
less likely to feel hostile or defensive and fair 
more likely to make a serious commitment to change 
behavior. The "constructive" approach to employee 
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Hi Deputies George S. Alexanderson and Charles H. Martin (the 
deputies) appeal the trial court's order granting Utah Countyfs 
petition for an extraordinary writ under rule 65B of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court found the deputies1 
employment grievance untimely and reversed the Utah County Career 
Service Council's (the Council) decision favoring the deputies. 
We reverse. 
BACKGROUND1 
^2 In 1991, the deputies were employed by the Utah County 
Sheriffs Department (the Department) as shift supervisors in the 
Utah County Jail. After a reclassification study, the Department 
1* "We recite the facts in a light most favorable to the 
decision of the fact finder." In re B.S.V. , 2002 UT App 343,112, 
57 P.3d 1127 (quotations and citation omitted). Here, the fact 
finder was the Council, which ruled in favor of the deputies. 
eliminated all shift supervisor positions and opened four new 
sergeant positions, with a higher rank and pay than shift 
supervisor. Before filling the new sergeant positions, the 
Department moved the deputies and other shift supervisors to the 
lower rank of corrections specialist, with no reduction in pay. 
Because the duties of sergeant were similar to those of shift 
supervisor, and based on representations made to them by 
management, the deputies believed they would be promoted to 
sergeant. Both deputies requested to be considered for the 
sergeant positions. In December 1991, the Department made its 
hiring decisions, and neither deputy was promoted. 
%3 Although the deputies were qualified for the sergeant 
position, some of those who were promoted to sergeant, as the 
Council later found, did not meet minimum qualification 
requirements. The deputies suspected that several of those 
promoted were not qualified, but the deputies claim they did not 
have access to sufficient eligibility lists and did not at that 
time investigate further or pursue formal grievances. 
1(4 Between 1992 and 1996, both deputies continued to express 
interest in obtaining sergeant positions and participated in 
testing and other evaluation procedures. In December 1996, the 
deputies learned from a sergeant that a lieutenant in the 
Department wanted him to manipulate the testing results involving 
a separate position within the Department. After the deputies 
met with Sheriff Bateman to discuss their concerns regarding 
promotions and evidence of corruption within the Department, the 
sheriff sent a letter to Deputy Martin dated December 17, 1996. 
In that letter, Sheriff Bateman stated, for the first time, that 
shift supervisors were not automatically promoted to sergeant 
because the position of shift supervisor "was never a ranked 
position." In fact, shift supervisor was a ranked position, and 
the deputies thus discovered they had possibly not been 
considered as ranked officers when applying for promotion to 
sergeant. 
1J5 The deputies filed a grievance with the Council on January 
10, 1997, challenging the sheriff's promotion procedures and 
continued failure to promote them to the rank of sergeant. The 
Council consists of three members appointed by Utah County^ (the 
County) legislative body, see Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4(1) (a) (I) 
(2001),2 charged with hearing employment grievances filed by 
county career service employees. See id. § 17-33-4(1) (b) . The 
2. In 1997, the county "legislative body" appointed the 
Council's members. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4 (2001) 
(amendment notes). The 2001 amendments changed this to an 
"executive" appointment. See id. 
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County contended the grievance violated timeliness requirements 
from the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and 
Regulations, which require written notice of a grievance "within 
three months from the date of occurrence." After hearing 
evidence, on June 30, 1997, the Council concluded the grievance 
petition was timely and ruled substantively in favor of the 
deputies, finding that "promotions [were] based on arbitrary 
criteria," with "inconsistent, biased and capricious" testing 
procedures. The Council concluded that the deputies1 "discussion 
with Sheriff Bateman in December, 1996 was the date that should 
drive the time for filing." Because the deputies "filed within 
90 days of that date," the Council reached the substantive 
issues. 
%6 In July 1997, the County petitioned the trial court for an 
extraordinary writ under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, again arguing the deputies1 grievance was untimely. 
The trial court remanded the case to the Council for the entry of 
findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with its June 
30, 1997 ruling. The Council never complied with the remand 
order.3 Finally, after briefing and oral argument, on September 
27, 2001, the trial court found the deputies1 claims untimely as 
a matter of law. The deputies now appeal that decision. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
H7 The deputies challenge the trial court's reversal of the 
Council's determination that the deputies' grievance petition was 
timely. Because the County brought its trial court petition 
under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "this court 
looks at the administrative proceeding as if the petition were 
brought here directly, even though technically it is the [trial] 
court's decision that is being appealed." Tolman v. Salt Lake 
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "We give 
no deference to the [trial] court's initial appellate review 
since it was a review of the record, which this court is just as 
capable of reviewing as the district court." Id. 
%8 Rule 65B provides, in part, "Where no other plain, speedy 
and adequate remedy is available,[4] a person may petition the 
3. All three original Council members were no longer on the 
Council. Thus, the new Council members were not well-suited to 
comply with the remand order. 
4. The Utah Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4 in 2001 
by adding a procedure for appeals of Council decisions to the 
(continued...) 
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court for extraordinary relief . . . . where an . . . 
administrative agency . . . has . . . abused its discretion." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a), (d) (2) (A) . A rule 65B abuse of 
discretion hinges on whether the Council "misused11 or "exceeded" 
its discretion. Tolman, 818 P.2d at 27 (citations omitted). 
"However, as noted by both this court and the Utah Supreme Court, 
1
 abuse of discretion1 for [r]ule 65B(d) (2) (A) writs must be much 
more blatant than the garden variety 'abuse of discretion' 
featured in routine appellate review." State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 
918, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing Renn v. Utah State Bd. of 
Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995)). For example, in Stirba, 
this court found that a "simple mistake of law does not qualify 
as the kind of gross and flagrant abuse of discretion necessary 
for a [r]ule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue."5 Id. at 923. Thus, we 
will reverse the Council's legal conclusion regarding its 
timeliness rule only if it is a gross and flagrant abuse of 
discretion. We review any underlying factual findings under a 
clearly erroneous standard. See Mule-Hide Prods. Co. v. White, 
2002 UT App 1,^11, 40 P.3d 1155. 
ANALYSIS 
%9 The County argues the Council misapplied its timeliness rule 
for hearing appeals. Section VII E.l of the Utah County Office 
of Personnel Management Rules and Regulations provides, "Any 
career service employee who has completed a . . . probationary 
period . . . having a grievance over merit principles may appeal 
to the Career Service Council. The employee must file a written 
notice with the personnel director within three months from the 
date of the occurrence." Here, the Council concluded that the 
deputies1 "discussion with Sheriff Bateman in December, 1996 was 
4. (.,.continued) 
trial courts, see id. at § 17-33-4 (1) (d) (2001) (amendment 
notes), but this was not in effect in 1997 when the County first 
petitioned for an extraordinary writ. 
5. The County argues this court's rule 65B abuse of discretion 
analysis in State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), 
applies only to cases where an appeal is statutorily prohibited. 
We disagree. In Stirba, this court separately discussed a 
statutory limit placed on the State's right to appeal. See id. 
at 923. Further, we cited Indian Vill. Trading Post, Inc. v. 
Bench, 929 P.2d 367 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) in support of our rule 
65B abuse of discretion analysis. See Stirba, 972 P*2d at 923. 
Bench did not involve a statutory limit of appeal. See 929 P 2d 
at 370 (discussing use of rule 65B to "compel correction of a 
public officer's gross abuse of discretion" (emphasis added)). 
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the date that should drive the time for filing," and that because 
the deputies "filed within 90 days of that date," their petition 
was timely. 
HlO Implicit in this determination is a factual finding that the 
deputies were not reasonably aware of their grievance until their 
December 1996 discussion with the sheriff. The deputies first 
learned in December 1996 that Sheriff Bateman erroneously 
believed the position of shift supervisor "was never a ranked 
position." Prior to December 1996, the deputies did not know, 
and had no reason to know, of the possibility that they were 
personally passed over for promotion because of an incorrect 
assumption regarding their qualifications. Thus, the Council's 
implicit factual finding was not clearly erroneous.6 
Ull Moreover, because the Council had reason to believe the 
deputies were not reasonably aware of their employment grievance 
until December 1996, the Council did not grossly and flagrantly 
abuse its discretion in concluding, as a matter of law, that the 
grievance's "date of . . . occurrence" was in December 1996. 
Therefore, the Council's legal conclusion that the deputies1 
grievance was timely was not a gross and flagrant abuse of 
discretion.7 
6. Although lower tribunals should make explicit factual 
findings, the "'failure to make factual findings is not 
reversible error'" where, as here, "the facts in the record are 
'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding 
in favor of the judgment.1" American Fork City v. Singleton, 
2002 UT App 331,1(8, 57 P. 3d 1124 (quoting Acton v. Deli ran, 737 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). Here, the County does not dispute 
that, in December 1996, the deputies first learned of the 
sheriff's erroneous assumption regarding the status of the shift 
supervisor position. 
Furthermore, any remand to the Council for factual findings 
would not be helpful in this case. The trial court 
unsuccessfully attempted such a remand, and the Council members 
who sat on this case are no longer available or with the Council. 
7. Furthermore, even if the Council technically deviated from 
its rule, it was still within rule 65B parameters. Cf. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d at 876, 879 
(Utah 1992), superceded on other grounds, Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
610(1)(b) (Supp. 1993) (concluding appellate courts should 
"uphold reasonable and rational departures" from an agency's own 
rules, "absent a showing that the departure violated some other 
right" (emphasis added)). The Council must be "in sympathy with 




Ul2 We conclude the Council did not grossly and flagrantly abuse 
its discretion in allowing the deputies' appeal under its 
timeliness rule. We therefore reverse the trial courtfs ruling.8 
Judith M. Billings, Judge ^ 
1l3 WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson ,£/ 
Presiding Judge 
^ - J 
James/2/7 Davis , J>p9ge 
7. ( . . .continued) 
employment, Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4(1) (a) (i) , and the three 
month timeliness requirement stems from a procedural and internal 
personnel rule. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-10 (2001). Given the 
deputies1 new information and the Council's finding that the 
Department's promotions were arbitrary, the Council could have 
equitably decided to slightly deviate from its timeliness rule. 
8. At oral argument, the County urged us to alternatively remand 
this case to the trial court for findings on the me^rits. 
However, in its memorandum decision reversing the Council's 
timeliness decision, the trial court clearly upheld the Council's 
conclusions on the merits, and the County has filed no cross 
appeal. Specifically, the trial court stated, " [T"| his court is 
persuaded that there is sufficient evidence to support [the 
deputies'] claim that the County deviated from a regular process 
of promotion based on merit principles. Therefore, the finding 
of the Council on this issue will not be overturned." 
20020143-CA 6 
FSLED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
M. CORT GRIFFIN (4583) 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
KAY BRYSON (0473) 
Utah County Attorney 
Attorneys for Respondent 
100 East Center, Suite 2400 
Provo, IJT 84606 
Telephone: (801) 370-8001 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, 
Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 
FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELEEF 
vs. 
: Case No. 970400590 
GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON, : Honorable Fred D. Howard 
CHARLES H. MARTIN, : 
Respondents. : 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing as regularly scheduled on the 27th day of July, 
2001 at 1:30 p.m. before the Honorable Fred D. Howard. Petitioner, Utah County, was represented 
by its attorney of record, M. Cort Griffin, and Sheriff David Bateman was present on behalf of 
Petitioner. Respondents were present and represented by their attorney of record, Stephen W Cook. 
The Court, having heard the arguments of the parties and having taken this matter under advisement, 
and having considered the relevant pleadings, memoranda of the parties and the record, and being 
fully advised in the premises HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
\fzfoz* m\ Deputy 
That the Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the above entitled matter is hereby granted The 
decision of the Utah County Career Service Council in this matter is respectfully reversed and 
Respondents' claims are hereby dismissed for Respondents failure to timely file their grievances 
before the Utah County Career Service Council. 




I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief to the below named party at the address set forth below, this \c~) ""day of 
December, 2001. 
Stephen W. Cook 
323 South 600 East, Suite 200 




Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 




GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON, 
CHARLES H. MARTIN, 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case U 970400590 AA 
Hon. Fred D. Howard 
The above-entitled matter came before the court on the Petitioner's Motion for Extraordinary 
Relief. The court having reviewed the Petition, and the Respondent's Objection thereto; and the court 
having considered the relevant documents and the parties' respective arguments makes the following 
decision. 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
I. Standard of Review 
Under UtahKCiv.P. 65B(d)(2)(A), this court may grant appropriate relief "where an inferior 
court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial fiinctions has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
abused its discretion." This court acts as an appellate court and will accord the Career Services 
Council (hereafter, the Council) broad deference in its findings of fact, but will review the Council's 
conclusions of law for correctness. 
1 
H. Merit Principles 
In its June 30, 1997, letter of decision to Deputies Martin and Alexanderson, the Council 
specifically found that "promotions were based on arbitrary criteria. The current testing procedures 
appear inconsistent, biased and capricious. Evidence supported the fact that some employees were 
promoted to the Sergeant's rank that did not meet the qualifications outlined in the various policies." 
The Council did not make specific citations to the record to support its findings. 
The record and pleadings in this case are voluminous and this court will not attempt to re-
iterate point by point the evidence in support and contrary to the Council's findings. After iully 
reviewing the transcript of the Council hearings, and the pleadings filed by both parties, this court 
finds sufficient evidence to uphold the Council's finding that the testing procedures were at best 
inconsistent, and very likely involved subjective criteria to the point of being arbitrary and violative 
of merit principles. 
Of specific concern to the court is the use of the Jail Policies and Procedures Manual (PPM) 
by the County. The County argues that the JPPM is advisory and not binding between the County and 
its employees. While such an argument may attempt to place the County on firm legal ground, it 
cannot do so where the JPPM was used as a sword against employees and a shield to protect the 
County from liability. In this matter, officer employees were expected to "have read and expressed 
their clear understanding of the material to the satisfaction of the Jail Training Officer," even though 
it had no legal effect whatsoever. The court is persuaded that the manner in which the JPPM was 
2 
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utilized communicated to officer employees that it could be relied upon despite the disclaimer. It is 
the County's position that while the JPPM is non-binding and can be changed at any time, an 
employee is expected to know and understand all of this non-binding material Such an approach is 
inherently unfair as illustrated with the following examples. 
Section 150.0 states that "the retention and promotion of all jail staff members will be based 
on the demonstration of merit, specified qualifications, and competitive examinations." To the 
deputies' assertion that this provision was violated, the County responds that even if it was, it does 
not matter because it was not binding in any case. Assuming the County is correct, however, this 
circumstance leaves the deputy applicant unable to assess what he or she nees to do to qualify for 
promotion. It is reasonable for the deputy to believe that the policies described in the JPPM will be 
followed; and if are not binding, the county has an obligation to give adequate advance notice to 
employees of where they intend to vary from the JPPM directions. 
Another example is §150.2(1) which states that "all staff members who desire promotion will 
be subject to (a) written examination, (b) oral interviews and (c) review evaluations and length of 
service." The County argues that the phrase "subject to" means that while the County may use these 
criteria in the promotion process it is not required to because it is given discretion and flexibility. 
Further, it contends that even if it does mean they must consider such criteria, no violation of merit 
principles occurred because this provision is not binding. However, the court is unpersuaded by such 
argument because again, a deputy is unable to assess what criteria will be utilized in the promotion 
3 
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process notwithstanding published JPPM criteria. Numerous other illustrations of conflict and 
contradiction with the use of the JPPM and the promotion process are contained in the parties' 
pleadings. 
In addition to the preceding, the court also notes the argument of the Petitioner that ultimately 
it is unimportant whether the promotion process differs from one hiring to the next so long as all of 
the individual applicants are equally treated within the same promotion process. The court strongly 
disagrees with this argument. Such an argument ignores the possibility that the playing field can be 
slanted before the process even begins. With the promotion requirements in a constant state of flux, 
applicants are unable to reasonably and accurately assess the testing procedures and the subjective 
weight given to each of the promotion criteria from one hiring to the next. The applicants are unable 
to reasonably forecast the promotion qualifications and make advance preparations for his or her 
application. Further, the process is subject to manipulation to favor or prevent qualified individuals 
from acquiring promotions for reasons other than merit principles. 
Taken together, this court is persuaded that there is sufficient evidence to support 
Respondents' claim that the County deviated from a regular process of promotion based on merit 
principles. Therefore, the finding of the Council on this issue will not be overturned. 
HI. Statute of Limitations 
The court next examines the question of whether as a matter of law, Respondents' claims are 
barred by the statute of limitations. In its letter decision the Council stated that "we did not feel like 
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this hearing should be barred because of the issue of timeliness. We felt like your discussion with 
Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing. You filed within 
90 days of that date, therefore, we proceeded with the hearing." This decision is a conclusion of law 
that must be reviewed for correctness. 
By their own claim, Respondents expected that all shift supervisors would be promoted to 
Sargent after the 1991 salary survey. Neither Respondent was promoted, a fact known by each of 
them in 1991. The cause of action of each Respondent arose at that time, the time of their non-
promotion. 
Section VILE. 1 of the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and Regulations 
states: 
Any career service employee who has completed a Schedule B probationary period 
or a promotional trial period having a grievance over merit principles may appeal to 
the Career Service Council. The employee must file a written notice with the 
personnel director within three months of the date of the occurrence. 
Utah case law holds that "Generally, a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of limitations 
begin to run when the last event that will complete the cause of action occurs, and simple ignorance 
of or obliviousness to the existence of a cause of action will not prevent the running of the statute of 
limitations." Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc. 920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah App. 1996). In this 
matter, the record is clear that the statute of limitations period began when Respondents were passed 
over for promotion in 1991. By express ordinance rule, they were to file their grievance complaint 
within three months of such occurrence. They failed to bring their claim within the three months of 
5 
the alleged grievance. 
After careful review of the parties' authorities and argument on this subject, the court, is 
persuaded that the Council erroneously relied on the December 1996 meeting with Sheriff Bateman 
as the "occurrence" that commenced the statute of limitations period. The court is unpersuaded by 
the circumstances of this case that the conversation with Sheriff Bateman renewed the limitations 
time period. Respondents' request that past grievances be "looked into" cannot be considered an 
"occurrence" within the meaning of the statute of limitations. Otherwise, as correctly noted by 
Petitioner, anytime an aggrieved party requested reconsideration, the limitations time period would 
begin to run anew thus defeating public policies of the statute of limitations entirely. 
Among other things, the statute of limitations prevents the "revival of claims that have been 
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared." Sew v. Security Title. 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995). A review of the hearing 
transcript persuasively reveals that such described dangers are present in this case - documents have 
been destroyed, witnesses are unable to remember important events, and other important witnesses 
cannot be located. 
There is no factual dispute that Respondents failed to properly raise their claim within three 
months of the alleged grievance. The record is also void of facts that would allow this court to apply 
the discovery, fraudulent concealment or the exceptional circumstances exceptions. For these reasons, 
and those stated in Petitioner's memoranda, the statute of limitations has long passed and 
6 
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Respondents' claims are barred as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, the Petition for Extraordinary Relief is granted. 
While there is merit to Respondents' claims that the County's promotion process is inconsistent, 
arbitrary and violative of merit principles, Respondents' claims are barred as a matter of law by the 
Statute of Limitations. 
The decision of the Career Services Council is respectfully reversed and Respondents' claims 
dismissed. Counsel for Petitioner is to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling and subnut it to 
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to final submission to the Court for signature. 
DATED this ^ T ^ d a y of !s%dL> 2001 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that true copies of the foregoing order were mailed, postage prepaid, on the ^ * day 
of September 2001 to the following at the addresses indicated, to wit: 
Stephen W.Cook 
323 South 600 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
M. Court Griffin 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2400 
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PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT : 
UTAH COUNTY GOVERNMENT 
Employer 
The previous Utah County Career Service Council, (none of whom are still on the 
Council) heard the case and entered a decision. Utah County filed a petition for extraordinary 
relief from that decision. The Court, in or about October 27, 1997 entered an Order of Remand 
to the Council. The Council reviewed the record and filed a response. The Court ruled the 
Councils response inadequate and directed, pursuant to an Order to Show Cause, a satisfactory 
response to the Remand Order. 
The existing Council has spent many hours with this case, reviewing written record and 
attempting to understand the audio tape record, which in many parts is "inaudible". After 
completing its review, this Council is unanimous in its disagreement with the prior Council's 
decision. 
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The Order of Remand dated October 27, 1997, permits and directs this Council, in its 
discretion, to: 
iii. Review all or such portions of the record as it may deem necessary or desirable; 
v. Make such changes, additions, or modifications to its decision as it may deem 
necessary or desirable; and 
vi. Do such other things, and take such further actions, as it may deem necessary or 
desirable to clarify or enhance the record of the proceeding for eventual review by 
this Court. 
Upon completion of the foregoing, this Court would then perform its review in 
accordance with applicable law as requested by Utah County in its petition for extraordinary 
relief 
As directed, the present Council now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A Classification Study occurred and was completed on July 15, 1991, where the 
title of Shift Supervisor was eliminated. In response to this change Sergeant 
2 
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positions were created at the jail 
When the title of shift supervisor was eliminated, those who had such jobs 
continued working as Correction Specialists with no change in grade or salary. 
Martin and Alexanderson who had been Shift Supervisors applied to become 
Sergeants in 1991 and were not promoted. 
Deputy Martin wrote a letter in April 1992, explaining how he felt about the 
process of choosing Sergeants. No formal grievance was filed at that time. 
Application were taken for various Sergeant positions between 1991 and 1996. 
Martin and/or Alexanderson applied for some, but not all of those positions. They 
were not promoted. No grievance was filed for any of those hiring decisions. 
A meeting was held on December 17, 1996, at which Martin and Alexanderson 
explained to Sheriff Bateman their frustration with hiring decisions made between 
1991 and 1996. Bateman prepared a memorandum of that meeting dated 
December 30, 1996, addressing their concerns. 
Grievance dated January 10, 1997, was filed after reviewing Sheriff Bateman's 
memo dated December 30, 1996, by Martin and Alexanderson. 
3 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The grievance of George Aiexanderson and Charles Martin dated January 10, 1997 was 
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loyd Evans - Utah County Career Service Council 





I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling with postage 
prepaid theron this OSi day of M-pH I , "ZOCO » t o the following: 
Charles Martin 
487 North 1080 East 
Orem, UT 84057 
George Alexanderson 
P.O. Box 706 
American Fork, UT 84003 
•Stephen W.Cook 
323 South 600 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
100 East Center 
Provo, UT 84606 
Utah County Sheriff 
3075 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
,4wh K^--^ te-7km 
Sarah Ruiz \ ~ ~ ~ ~ J E > a t e 
Career Service Council Secretary 
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Career Service Council 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2200 
Prove-, UT 84606 
November 22,1999 
Deputy George S. Alexanderson 
P.O. Box 706 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Charles H. Martin 
487 North 1080 East 
Orem,UT 84057 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
Provo,UT 84606 
Stephen W.Cook 
323 South 600 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
RE: Fourth Judicial District Court / Case #: 970400590 
To the above parties: 
The Career Service Council has reviewed the documents on file in this informally administered 
case. None of the current members of the council were involved in the hearings or the decision 
rendered in this matter. After review, the council determines the previous decision dated June 
30,1997, is a "final decision" in this matter as contemplated by UCA 63-46b-5(i). 
All proceedings in this matter were conducted informally according to the history and practice of 
the Career Service Council. The informal record is, in significant parts, unintelligible and 
impossible to review. 
The council determines that the appeal for judicial review of this informal proceeding be 




Lloyd Evans - Career Service Council 
j±]%2$ 
Mark F. Robinson - Career Service Council Date 
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David L. Blackner, Utah State Bar No. 5376 
THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID L. BLACKNER 
Attorney for Respondents 
Kearns Building Mezzanine 
134 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)521-3480 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, ; 
Petitioner, • 
vs. ! 
GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON and 
CHARLES H. MARTIN, 
Respondents. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND REMANDING MATTER 
TO UTAH COUNTY CAREER SERVICE 
COUNCIL 
'. Case No.: 970400590 
! Judge: The Honorable Howard H. Maetani 
Respondents Alexanderson and Martin's motion to dismiss petitioner Utah 
County's petition for extraordinary relief came on for hearing before the Court on 
October 1, 1997 at 8:30 a.m., the Honorable Howard H. Maetani presiding. Respondents 
were represented in person at the hearing by their counsel, David L. Blackner. Petitioner 
was represented in person at the hearing by its counsel, M. Cort Griffin. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings filed by the parties, and having heard 
arguments on the matter, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
a. That respondents5 motion to dismiss the petition is hereby denied. 
91 c: 
i 
b. That this matter be remanded to the Utah County Career Service Council (the 
"Council") for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law in connection with its 
decision of June 30,1997, but that this Court will retain jurisdiction over this matter 
pending the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Council. 
c. That in connection with the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, the Council may, among other things, as it, in its discretion, may elect: 
i. Request that one, both, or neither of the parties prepare proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law for adoption by the 
Council; 
ii. Hear any objections to such proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as it may choose to hear and consider; 
iii. Review all or such portions of the record as it may deem necessary 
or desirable; 
iv. Take such further testimony, or accept such further evidence, as it 
may deem necessary or desirable; 
v. Make such changes, additions, or modifications to its decision as it 
may deem necessary or desirable; and 
vi. Do such other things, and take such further actions, as it may deem 
necessary or desirable to clarify or enhance the record of the 
proceedings for eventual review by this Court, 
d. That petitioner Utah County arrange for, and bear the cost of, the preparation 
of a hearing transcript by a certified court reporter and that such transcript be provided to 
2 
the Council in connection with the preparation of such findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
e. That upon the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions of law by the 
Council, and the delivery of the record to the Court, this Court will then perform its 
review thereof in accordance with applicable law and as requested by Utah County in its 
petition for extraordinary relief 
DATED this ^ day of October, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ( y? day of October, 1997,1 mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
REMANDING MATTER TO UTAH COUNTY CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL by first 
class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
M. Cort Griffin 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2400 
Provo,Utah 84606 
Utah County Career Service Council 
Merrit Fullmer, Council Secretary 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2200 
Provo,Utah 84606 
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June 30, 1997 
Deputy George S. Alexanderson 
P.O. Box 607 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Deputy Charles H. Martin 
487 N. 1080 E. 
Orem, UT 84603 
Dear Deputies Martin and Alexanderson, 
Thank you for your patience in awaiting a reply regarding your grievance hearing. As a 
Career Service Council we felt like we needed to take the time to review your case carefully. The 
following is an outline of your statement of relief and our recommendation resulting from the 
hearing. 
1) Retroactive reinstatement to the rank of Sergeant (formerly named Shift 
Supervisor), non-probationary and competent level 
The council does not recommend that you be reinstated to the rank of Sergeant because 
you never achieved that rank. However, we do recommend that you both be promoted to the 
Sergeant's rank, effective immediately. 
2) Appropriate Reparations 
a) Back Pay at Sergeants level of compensation 
b) Attorneys Fees and Costs 
In addition to the promotion to Sergeant, the council recommends pay at the Sergeant's 
level retroactive to December 9, 1991, when the first promotions to Sergeants became effective 
after the Shift Supervisor position was eliminated. We recommend that the county take into 
consideration appropriate Cost of Living Allowance when calculating retroactive pay. The pay 
should not include merit increases and other possible related benefits commensurate with the rank 
of Sergeant. 
The council is unable to make a ruling on the attorneys fees and costs because it is outside 
our scope of authority, 
3) Implementation of Standardized and Unbiased Testing Procedures 
It appears that promotions have been based on arbitrary criteria. The current testing 
procedures appear inconsistent, biased and capricious. Evidence supported the fact that some 
employees were promoted to the Sergeant's rank that did not meet the qualifications outlined in 
the various policies. 
The council recommends that the county implement standardized and unbiased testing 
procedures. All policies regarding promotional testing should be updated, consistent with each 
other, clearly communicated to all applicable employees, and carefUlly followed. 
4) Written Admission and Apology, to be placed in Deputies personnel files, that 
failure to give Deputies earned rank of Sergeant was an oversight 
The council believes a written admissions and apology is not necessary. The above 
outlined recommendations should be adequate to substantiate and resolve your concerns. 
In addition to the above statement of relief, the council would also like to address the 
concern brought up by you regarding your statement that you were not promoted because you are 
not members of the Mormon faith. The council feels there was insufficient evidence to support 
this. 
The council would also like to reconfirm that we did not feel like this hearing should be 
barred because of the timeliness of filing. We felt like your discussion with Sheriff Bateman in 
December, 1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing. You filed within 90 days of that 
date, therefore, we proceeded with the hearing. 
Again, thank you for your patience in bringing this issue to resolution. 
.Sincerely, 
Deborah L. Gateley, Utah County Career Service Council Date 
t>/Ww 
~\\ 7 7rwTT R y p R. Beuhring, Utah Coumy Career Service Council Date 
cc: Kay Bryson - Utah County Attorney 
personnel file 
UTAH COUNTY 
Class T i t l e : Sergeant Class Code:: HO&C 
Effective Date: ~ 
Grade Number: \k^ / f T 
GENERAL PURFOSE 
Under the general supervision of Lieutenant, perrorms sipervisory ana 
technica l police work. 
EXAMPLE OF DUTIES 
A- J a i l Sergeant 
Supervises the Correctional Spec ia l i s t s , Correctional Counselor, Head 
J a i l Matron, and Ja i l Matrons t o insure secur i ty of the prison, 
cons t i tu t iona l r i ch t s and safety of inmates, and adherence to j a i l 
pract ices and procedures; runs the lineup room; books, escor ts , and 
re leases prisoners; operates control room, including camera monitors, 
control panel and computer; maintains records of inc idents , visitations,, 
medications and bookings and submits t o the J a i l Lieutenant; purchases 
medical equipment ana supplies; insures proper maintenance of equipment 
and prison f a c i l i t y ; operates firearms, b rea tha l ize r , radar equipment, 
and 2-way radio; performs other related dut ies as assigned, 
B. Detective Sergeant 
Supervises Detectives and performs technical work i n the investigation of 
crime; makes case assignments t o subordinates; a s s i s t s , advises and 
evaluates cases assigned; reviews cases referred by Patrol Division; 
reviews case reports submitted by Detectives; maintains own caseload, 
co l l ec t s evidence, interviews victims and witnesses, photographs crime 
scenes, develops informants, and writes repor ts ; t e s t i f i e s in court as 
necessary; schedules personnel for time off t o insure an adequate number 
of detect ives available for each case; operates photographic equipment, 
undercover surveil lance equipment, firearms, k i t s for f ield testing of 
narcot ics and fingerprinting; performs other re la ted dut ies as assigned. 
C. Patrol Sergeant 
Supervises Deputy Sheriffs and performs dut ies of a pa t ro l officer to 
insure maintenance of highway and public safety for unincorporated areas 
and contraced incorporated c i t i e s ; evaluates, t r a i n s , advises and directs 
subordinates in the i r work; serves as sh i f t commander and coordinates and 
d i r ec t s assigned department operations; has delegated responsibili ty for 
the provision of effective and eff ic ient se rv ices ; plans and schedules 
personnel for routine and unusual purposes during s h i f t s ; coordinates and 
supervises volunteer search and rescue teams; provides input into the 
preparation of division budget, pol ic ies and procedures- Enforces laws 
pertaining to the operation of motor vehicles on Utah public highways; 
directs and controls traffic; performs other police duties including 
making arrests, testifying in court, writing reports and issuing 
citations; operates firearms, radar gun, and emergency search and rescue 
equipment; performs other related duties as assigned. 
D, Other Sergeants may be assigned duties similar to those listed above in 
categories A, B, and C. 
MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS 
1. Education and Experience: 
Four (4) years of experience as a deputy s h e r i f f or detect ive. 
2. Special Requirements: 
P.OoS.T. C e r t i f i c a t i o n ; qua l i f y i ng score on the Sergeant's examination, 
3. Necessary Knowledge, S k i l l s , and A b i l i t i e s : 
Considerable knowledge o f laws, ordinances, and regulations on 
highways, t r a f f i c d i rec t i on and c o n t r o l , recogn i t i on , co l lec t ion , 
p repara t ion , preservat ion, and laws of evidence; considerable 
knowledge of cr iminal law and techniques of court procedure; 
considerable knowledge of recording and repor t ing of a c t i v i t i e s ; 
considerable knowledge of mechanics and techniques of ar res t ; 
considerable knowledge of accident i nves t i ga t i on and repor t ing; 
considerable knowledge of p r i n c i p l e s , methods, and techniques of 
e f f e c t i v e t r a i n i n g , superv is ion, and personnel pract ices. 
S k i l l in the operation of f i rearms and other equipment related to 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n , highway and publ ic sa fe ty , and cor rec t ion. 
A b i l i t y to establ ish working re la t ionsh ips w i t h the general pub l ic , 
community professionals, i n t r a and interdepartmental personnel; 
a b i l i t y to accurately assess and take e f f e c t i v e act ion in emergencies; 
a b i l i t y to communicate e f f e c t i v e l y , ve rba l l y and i n w r i t i n g . 
CLASSIFICATION GUIDELINES 
1. Knowledge and Tra in ing: 
(see above) 
2. Accountab i l i t y : 
Work is controlled by practices and procedures which are covered by 
well defined policy which could result in loss of or damage to 
equipment, and lessen security in the community. 
3. D i f f i c u l t y of Work: 
Work consists of unusual and d i f f i c u l t circumstances requir ing 
judgment and moderate mental demand to choose appropriate methods 
Personal Contacts: 
Contacts are non-routine and involve inmates, the general public, 
intra and interdepartmental personnel and community professionals for 
the purpose of moderately complex problem solving. 
Supervision Exercised: 
May supervise and be responsible for work accomplishment of up to 
twelve (12) employees; schedules and assigns work; makes recommenda-
tions for hiring and discipline-
Physical Effort: 
Effort is minimal and ranges from sitting or standing to considerable 
lifting, pushing, pulling, crouching or stooping in the performance 
of police work. 
Working Conditions: 
Working conditions are adequate. However, work involves recurring 
exposure to hazards which involve chance of major injury or death; 
traveling in an automobile may be required. May be required to re-
spond for emergencies 24 hours a day. 
ITFAH COUNTY JOB DESCRIPTION 
CLASS TITLES Sergeant/Jail Operations 
CLASS CODE: 3091 *>A/
 m*J~_* ^ „h Q7\ 
EFFECTIVE DATE; l^3^f( *W CO'W-lj) 
GRADE NUMBER: Jk%&D 
DEPARTMENT: Sheriff, Jail 
SUPERVISOR TITLE: Lieutenant 
LOCATION: Sheriff 
DATE PREPARED: 12-16-91 
JOB SUMMARY 
Responsible to supervise, coordinate, schedule, certified correctional 
staff, jail civilian staff, and supervise inmates. Insures prisoner righl 
are maintained and jail policy and procedures are followed, through 
actively motivating staff. Responsible for processing inmate requests, 
grievances, and disciplinary hearings. Investigates and recommends change 
on criminal activity committed by inmates. Classifies inmates according 
state law. Processes special requests regarding inmates. May act as a 
team leader for specific assignments. 
ACTIVITIES AND PERCENT OF TIME 
PERCENT OF 
TIME ACTIVITY 
Percent of time for each activity may vary according to assignment. 
30 Inmate grievance, disciplinary hearings, requests. Responds 
to formal inmate requests. Holds inmate disciplinary 
hearings. Handles inmate grievances. Monitors daily inmate 
behavior. Responds to questions and complaints and monitors 
general condition of the facility. Resolves inmate problems 
Contacts Adult Probation and Parole, courts, and judges with 
results of inmate disciplinary hearings and incidents. 
25 Inmate classification. Conducts detailed classification 
interview within first 72 hours of incarceration. Reviews 
classification forms completed at booking. Refers medical 
problems to medical staff. Interviews persons with history 
mental illness or suicide attempt to determine best housing 
options and refer to mental health services. Review crimina 
history of inmates. Completes transportation risk assessmen 
on all inmates booked. Figures release dates. Computes goo 
time for early release. Determines appropriate housing for 
inmates at booking and as court status changes. 
30 Correction staff supervision, relief staff duties. Schedule 
evaluates, disciplines correction staff. Reviews shift logs 
UTAH COUNTY JOB DESCRIPTION 
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A b i l i t y t o e s t a b l i s h e f f e c t i v e work ing r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h employees t o 
t r a i n , s u p e r v i s e , d i r e c t , and c o o r d i n a t e work. 
A b i l i t y t o e s t a b l i s h work ing r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c , 
communi ty p r o f e s s i o n a l s , i n t r a and i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l p e r s o n n e l . A b i l i t y t o 
a c c u r a t e l y a s s e s s and t a k e e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n i n e m e r g e n c i e s . A b i l i t y t o 
communica t e e f f e c t i v e l y v e r b a l l y and i n w r i t i n g . A b i l i t y t o a c t as i n t e r i m 
Emergency Commander a s n e e d e d . 
A b i l i t y t o i n t e r p r e t v a r i o u s c r i m i n a l documents ; c o u r t d o c k e t s , a r r e s t 
r e p o r t s , c r i m i n a l h i s t o r i e s . Working knowledge of i n m a t e r i g h t s . 
TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
R e q u i r e s c u r r e n t POST C e r t i f i c a t i o n and c u r r e n t CPR c e r t i f i c a t i o n . 
R e q u i r e s BS d e g r e e i n c l u d i n g 30 s e m e s t e r h o u r s i n p s y c h o l o g y , s o c i o l o g y , 
i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , o r c l o s e l y r e l a t e d f i e l d . 
REQUIRED WORK EXPERIENCE 
R e q u i r e s 3 y e a r s j o b r e l a t e d work e x p e r i e n c e w i t h d e m o n s t r a t e d competence 
Mus t p a s s background c h e c k . 
DECISION MAKING AND PROBLEM SOLVING 
D e c i s i o n s a r e made i n an env i ronmen t of p e r s o n a l and County l i a b i l i t y . 
D e c i d e s h o u s i n g a s s i g n m e n t fo r i n m a t e s . Judgment e r r o r s can r e s u l t i n 
i n m a t e i n j u r y or d e a t h . Dec ides s e c u r i t y a r r a n g e m e n t s t o t r a n s p o r t i n m a t e s 
b a s e d on p r o b a b l e r i s k . A s s i g n s , s c h e d u l e s , m o n i t o r s , and e v a l u a t e s 
c o r r e c t i o n s t a f f . S o l v e s p rob lems when c o m p l a i n t s a r i s e . De te rmines 
n e e d e d p u r c h a s e of s u p p l i e s and equ ipmen t . May a c t i v a t e s p e c i a l emergency 
t e a m s . 
INTERACTION WITH OTHERS 
I n t e r a c t s w i t h i n m a t e s , f ami ly of i n m a t e , o t h e r p o l i c e a g e n c i e s , b a i l 
bondsmen, c o u r t c l e r k s , j u d g e s , A d u l t - P r o b a t i o n and P a r o l e O f f i c e r s , 
a t t o r n e y s , o t h e r County d e p a r t m e n t s , menta l h e a l t h p r o g r a m s , o t h e r 
c o r r e c t i o n s o f f i c i a l s , v e n d o r s , and t h e p u b l i c . 
WORKING ENVIRONMENT 
P h y s i c a l : R o t a t i n g 24 hour s h i f t work w i t h o n - c a l l d u t i e s . J a i l 
f a c i l i t i e s have l i t t l e n a t u r a l l i g h t , poor t e m p e r a t u r e c o n t r o l , and crowde 
work s p a c e s . Exposed t o communicable d i s e a s e s . 
M e n t a l : E x p o s u r e t o i n t o x i c a t e d , b e l l i g e r e n t , m e n t a l l y u n s t a b l e 
i n m a t e s . Emergency s i t u a t i o n s a r i s e weekly , some t imes d a i l y ; c e l l b lock 
d i s t u r b a n c e s , f i g h t s , a s s a u l t s , p o t e n t i a l s u i c i d e s , and inmate i n j u r i e s -
S t a f f s h o r t a g e s mean S e r g e a n t i s p u l l e d from r e g u l a r d u t i e s t o per form 
c o r r e c t i o n s t a f f d u t i e s . F r equen t i n t e r r u p t i o n s from c o m p l a i n t s , problems: 
s u p e r v i s o r s c a n ' t h a n d l e , d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n s from c a l l e r s , e t c . R e c e i v e s 
phone c a l l s a t home when o f f - d u t y for p r o b l e m s . 
127,03 JAIL SERGEANT (ON-LINE) V^-j 
A. General Classification: Dej 
1. Category I Police Stat 
B. Duties and Responsibilities: 
1. Supervises the jail operation in the absence 
of the Jail Commander and the Administrative 
Sergeant. 
2. Reports to the Jail Commander on all 
operations of the Jail. 
3. Supervises the on-line jail activities 
controlling security, safety, and care of all 
the inmates and jail staff. 
4. Supervises shift supervisors who act as 
officers in charge when the Jail Administra-
tion is off duty. 
5. Supervises the correctional nurses and 
coordinates the Jail Health program. 
6. Supervises the dayshift Control Room 
Personnel, Secretary, and Control Board 
Operator. 
7. Coordinates with out of state agencies 
concerning the inmate extradition process. 
8. Conducts employee evaluation and disciplinary 
actions. 
9. Developes Standard Operating Procedures 
(S.O.P.'s) pertaining to security operations 
in the jail. 
10- Prepares all shift scheduling, including 
vacation, holiday, sick time, and 
emergencies. 
11. Coordinates maintenance work projects with 
County Personnel assigned to the Jail. 
12. Screens all booking sheets and other jail 
business to ensure correct booking records, 
billing agencies and other documentation. 
13. Screens the daily shift logs of each shift to 
ensure proper working procedures and 
security requirements are being adhered to. 
14. Investigates and prosecutes all criminal 
activity committed in the Jail by inmates. 
15. Acts as chairman of the Jail Disciplinary 
Board, 
16s Answer all inmate grievances and forwards 
the complaints to the Jail Commander for 
review. 
17, Coordinate with the Correctional Counselor 
in the classification of all inmates 
entering the Jail. 
, ) . > 
150.00 Reteirtxon and Promotion of Jail Employees (P-14) 
The retention and promotion of all Jail Staff members 
will be based on the demonstration of merit, specified 
qualifications and competitive examinations without 
regard to race, religion, sex or national origin. 
All personnel actions will be carried out rationally, 
impartially, and according to the law. 
150.01 County Personnel Employee Status Rules 
All jail staff members will be governed under the Rules 
and Regulations Section IV. "Employer Status, Probation 
and Promotion," including any Sheriff's additional 
policies for uniform merit personnel. 
Example of Change: 1. Utah County Deputy Sheriff 
probationary period is one (1) year, instead of a six 
(6) month probation period as for other non-uniformed 
county employees. 
150.02 Personal Advancement (P-3) 
Staff members who desire promotional advancement must 
obtain certain levels of proficiency according to the 
various work assignment^ and the length of service time 
with the Division. 
All staff members who desire promotion in the jail 
will be subject to: 
a. VZritten examination 
b. Oral interview 
c. Review of evaluations and length of service 
Staff who are on probationary status are not 
elegible for promotional advancement. 
The length of time served will be a basis for 
eligibility for the following positions-
a. Shift Supervisor - One (1) year fulltime 
employment and removed from probation. 
b. Sergeant - Three (3) years of Correctional 
Experience, including one (1) year as a Shift 
Supervisor o — :J* 
c. Lieutenant ~ Six (6) years of employment with 
the Utah County Sheriff's Office, including 
three (3) years in the rank of Sergeant in the 
Utah County Jail. 
rl 
